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Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress
This article will focus on how a simple procedural statute enacted to require enforcement
of arbitration agreements in federal court has become unrecognizable as the law Congress
adopted in1925. Today, as a result of judicial construction, the Federal Arbitration Act 1
(AFAA@) reaches much further and imposes itself on a far greater proportion of our citizens than
was ever envisioned in 1925. The FAA as interpreted affects statutory rights, consumer rights,
and employee rights, as well as state police powers to protect those rights.2 Today=s statute,
which has been construed to pre-empt state law,3 eliminate the requirement of consent to
arbitration,4 permit arbitration of statutory rights,5 and remove the jury trial right from citizens
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See generally, Paul D. Carrington and Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction,
1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. 331, 401 (1996) (AUnder the [arbitration] law written by the Court, birds
of prey will sup on workers, consumers, shippers, passengers, and franchisees; the protective
police power of the federal government, and especially of the state governments is
weakened...@; ...[D]isplacing adjudication through pre-dispute arbitration clauses
systematically reduces the legal liability of corporate defendants.@)
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Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Services, Inc. 372 F. 3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004)
(Arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts are generally enforceable.) Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Arbitration clauses have been enforced
even when consumers were illiterate or blind. Washington Mutual Finance Group v. Bailey,
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without their knowledge or consent,6 is a statute that would not likely have commanded a single
vote in the 1925 Congress.7
What processes and methods have enabled the judiciary to create a law never enacted by
Congress? This article will examine the interpretive methods the judiciary, particularly the
Supreme Court, has used in major cases that have defined the FAA, as well as the effect of the
choices it made. Part I will examine the context of the FAA, including the drafting and political
history, to see how the proponents of the Act and members of Congress understood the
arbitration act that was adopted virtually without opposition. Part II will explore how Erie v.
Tompkins8 and Guaranty Trust v. York9 produced a dilemma that caused the first major misstep
in interpreting the FAA. This occurred in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin,10 when the Supreme
Court incorrectly asserted that the 1925 Congress relied exclusively upon the commerce clause
as the underlying power for enacting the FAA. Part III will examine how the misstep in Prima
Paint led to even greater missteps in two subsequent cases, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital
v. Mercury Construction Corp.11 and Southland v. Keating.12 In those cases, the Supreme Court
6
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recast a procedural statute that was applicable only in federal court into a substantive statute
applicable in both state and federal courts. Part IV will follow the increasing expansion of the
statute, which the Court interpreted not only to cover statutory claims, an area never anticipated
by the enacting Congress, but also to cover worker agreements, which had been expressly
excluded by Congress in 1925.13 Finally, the major misconstructions which took place in Prima
Paint and Southland have recently been reconfirmed by the Court in its February, 2006 decision,
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.14 Moreover, in Buckeye, the Court expanded the
holding in Prima Paint by finding that an arbitrator rather than a court should decide a claim that
a contract is void for illegality.15
The article concludes that none of the different interpretive methods used by the Court to
construct the current statute served to cabin judicial discretion to legislate, which has resulted in
a complete rewriting of the statute. The statute=s new architecture has had a substantial impact on
our legal system. The FAA that has been created by the Supreme Court in the last twenty-five
years reflects judicial policy preferences reminiscent of the policies prevailing at the beginning
of the last century, including laissez-faire economics, and an antipathy to state laws and
regulations favoring individuals, consumers, and small businesses.
I. Intended Scope of the FAA
In the 1920's, Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer had a three step plan for promoting
arbitration: AThe first is to get a State statute, and then to get a Federal law to cover interstate
13
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15

See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
____ U.S. ____ (2006).
See id., at ___.
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and foreign commerce and admiralty, and third to get a treaty with foreign countries.@16 The two
men had already successfully combined forces in New York, where in 1920, Cohen, a lawyer
who served as general counsel for the New York State Chamber of Commerce, and Bernheimer,
a cotton goods merchant who chaired the Chamber=s arbitration committee, were instrumental in
obtaining the first modern state arbitration statute.17 The New York statute made all arbitration
agreements enforceable, including agreements to arbitrate future disputes. Before the enactment,
a party to an arbitration agreement could at any time prior to the award simply refuse to arbitrate,
and courts would not enforce the agreement.18 This was true whether the agreement was to
arbitrate future disputes, or to submit an existing dispute to arbitration.19
Cohen and Bernheimer were strong believers in the efficacy of arbitration. Although
justifiably proud of their success in New York, they wanted arbitration to be enforceable beyond
the state=s borders. If a New York party agreed to arbitrate with a citizen of another state, in the
other state, for example, in Vermont, which did not have a similar law, the arbitration agreement
would not be enforced in Vermont state court. More importantly, any enforcement attempt in
federal court under diversity jurisdiction would fail, because the federal courts would not
enforce the agreement. Federal and state courts both followed ancient rules of English law that
16

Cohen testimony at Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and R. 646 before the Joint
Committee of the Subcommittees on the Judiciary of the United States Senate and House of
Representatives, 68th Cong. 1st Session 17, at 16 (1924) (hereinafter, AJoint Hearings@).
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See generally, Ian R. MacNeil, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW, pp.28, 34-37
(1992). Professor MacNeil defines Amodern@ arbitration statutes as those that make
agreements to arbitrate future disputes irrevocable. Id. at 15.
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See W. Sturges, Commercial Arbitration and Awards, '76 at 237-39 (1930).
See MacNeil, supra note 17, at 20.
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Aperformance of a written agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced in equity, and... if an
action at law were brought...such agreement could not be pleaded in bar of the action, nor would
such an agreement be ground for a stay of proceedings until arbitration was had.@20
Cohen and Bernheimer=s next push, therefore, was twofold: to get Congress to pass a
federal law that would make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, and to get the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to put forth a Uniform
Arbitration Act which could then be adopted by each state, making arbitration agreements also
enforceable in state courts. Finally, a third step would be for the United States to enter into a
treaty with other nations to enforce international arbitration agreements and awards.21
The original Federal Arbitration Act was drafted, principally by Julius Cohen, on the
model of the New York statute.22 In their campaign to convince Congress to pass legislation that
would make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, Bernheimer and Cohen adopted
different functions.23 Bernheimer organized the support of the national business organizations.

20

S. Rep. No. 5365, 68th Cong., 1st Sess, 2 (1924). The Senate Report also noted that
the arbitration agreement Awas subject to revocation by either of the parties at any time
before the award,@ and that this rendered the agreements Aineffectual@ because Athe party
aggrieved by the refusal of the other party to carry out the arbitration agreement was without
adequate remedy.@Id.
21
22

See Joint Hearings, supra note16.
See id. at 15, 40.
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Their work began in advance of the passage of the New York statute. In 1918,
Cohen published a book, Commercial Arbitration and the Law. Under Bernheimer=s
leadership, the New York Chamber of Commerce joined forces with the New York State Bar
Association to work on this issue. Cohen and Bernheimer were effective proselytizers,
helping to pass an arbitration statute in New Jersey after the New York statute was adopted.
See MacNeil, supra note 17, at 28, 31, 42-43.
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Cohen spearheaded the legal case.
Bernheimer told the Joint Hearings of the Senate and House Subcommittees that Athe
statement I make is backed up by 73 commercial organizations in this country, who have, by
formal vote, approved the bill before you gentlemen.@24 He stated the practical, business case:
AArbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money... It preserves business friendships... It raises
business standards. It maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation, and eliminates
the law=s delay by relieving our courts.@25
Cohen, on the other hand, sought to convince Congress of the value of arbitration from
the legal perspective. Cohen=s strategy can be seen in the brief he submitted to Congress which
was made part of the record of the Congressional hearings.26 He explained why making
arbitration agreements enforceable would provide a much needed remedy for existing problems
in the legal system. He also sought to persuade Congress that although courts had in the past
refused to enforce arbitration agreements, this resulted from an anachronism in the law which
Congress had the power to correct. Further, he emphasized that public policy would be well
served by Congress adopting this legislation.
Cohen asserted that the statute was directed to three evils: 1. Long delays caused by
congested courts and excessive motion practice; 2. the expense of litigation; and 3. the failure
through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just.27 Businessmen needed solutions that were
24

See Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 7-8.
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simpler, faster, and cheaper. An arbitration act that would make arbitration agreements
enforceable would accomplish those goals and provide a remedy to the three evils. Cohen made
clear in his brief that what was being proposed to accomplish these goals was simple and limited
-- a statute that would apply only to procedure in the federal courts. It would not affect state law.
The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. .. It is no infringement upon the right
of each State to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under
its laws. To be sure, whether or not a contract exists is a question of the
substantive law of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made. But
whether or not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a question of the
law of procedure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction wherein the
remedy is sought.28
Cohen emphasized that because the statute was procedural, it would not Ainfringe upon
the provinces or prerogatives of the States.@29 Rather, he noted, A[t]here is no
disposition...by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling
submission to arbitration enforcement. The statute cannot have that effect.@30
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Id. at 37.
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Id. at 39.
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Id. at 40. One of Cohen=s fellow reformers, Alexander Rose, who represented a
precursor of the American Arbitration Association at the Joint Hearings - The Arbitration
Society of America B echoed Cohen=s call for federal legislation.
We have a weakness in our system of arbitration, We need, and we must have
the cooperation of the Federal courts. We must have....the Federal statute
because while the dispute is a domestic one, we can well dispose of it. But
when a merchant in New York sells his merchandise to someone in a foreign
jurisdiction, his arbitration law is defeated...In short, he needs the aid of the
Federal law.
Id. at 27. Like Cohen, Rose did not conceive of the law as having any direct applicability to
the states. Rather, he believed that if Congress adopted the statute, one significant benefit
would be that States, many of which had no arbitration laws, would be inspired to adopt
similar laws.
There is one excellent result to be achieved in the enactment of this bill, apart
7

Cohen also emphasized that the procedures for compelling arbitration as well as for
enforcing the award would be much more straightforward than litigated motions, thereby
reducing expense and delay through formalities or legal technicalities. He noted that
AEnforcement proceeds with a minimum of legal intervention, and parties are assured of ...[a]
speedy and expert hearing...@31
In explaining why this particular legislation was needed, Cohen first noted that since an
arbitration agreement is essentially a business contract, it should be treated the same as other
business contracts.32 Unlike other contracts, however, parties could revoke an arbitration
agreement at any point prior to the award being rendered.33 Moreover, although the revocation
was considered a breach, courts would not provide relief in the form of specific performance,
nor could a party obtain a stay of court proceedings so that an arbitration could go forward.34
Damages were technically available, but in practice were difficult if not impossible to prove.35

from the enactment itself: it will set a standard throughout the United States.
There are many States which have no arbitration law...[T]he enactment of this
law, extending its effect all over the United States, will have an effect upon
the cause of that much-desired thingBuniform legislation...I have no doubt all
of the States would pattern after it. Id. at 28.
31

Id. at 40. Rose made the case for simplicity more dramatically. A[T]he crying demand
and the need of the hour is what? It is to simplify legal matters... [Y]ou can have here a system
of arbitration which is one that the people want; the public want it. They want speedy justice,
and they want plain justice, in as simple terms as it can be reduced to.@ Id. at 26-27.
32

See id. at 39.
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See MacNeil, supra note 17, at 20.
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See id.
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See id. See also W. Sturges, supra note 18, ''85, 87, at 255-58, 262.
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This situation permitted Athe dishonest party [to] escape from his obligations.@36
Cohen=s brief explained the English origins of the courts= refusal to enforce arbitration
agreements:
For many centuries, there has been established a rule, rooted originally in the
jealousy of courts for their jurisdiction, that parties might not, by their agreement,
oust the jurisdiction of the courts. This rule was so firmly established that our
American courts did not feel themselves free to change the rule...37
Although courts did not feel free to make this change themselves, once the New York legislature
adopted a statute making arbitration agreements enforceable, New York courts, according to
Cohen, whole-heartedly accepted the change.38
Cohen, Bernheimer and their colleagues took great pains to impress upon Congress the
limited scope of the proposed legislation. W. H. H. Piatt, testifying in his capacity as Chairman
of the Committee of Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association,
explained, in response to a concern that the legislation would apply to seamen, that the statute
was not intended to cover workers.39 Although the bill did not specifically exclude all
employment contracts, the constitutional jurisprudence at the time viewed most employment
contracts as involving intrastate and not interstate commerce.40 Seamen, on the other hand, could

36

See Joint Hearings, supra note 16 at 39.
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Id.
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Id., citing Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc. 230 N.Y. 261 (1921).
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Sales & Contracts to Sell in Interstate & Foreign Commerce and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 67th
Cong. 4th Session 2, at 9 (1923) (hereinafter, A1923 Hearings@).
40

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (Souter, dissenting) ( AWhen
the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely confined) our case law indicated that
9

be viewed as having contracts that were in foreign or interstate commerce. Piatt and the other
proponents had no objection to specifically excluding them, and sought to make clear that other
workers, similar to seamen, who might be perceived as working in interstate commerce, would
also be excluded, since the FAA was not intended to cover employment contracts at all.41 Piatt
thus suggested adding the following language, Abut nothing herein contained shall apply to
seamen or any class of workers in interstate and foreign commerce@,42 noting that A[i]t is not
intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.@43
Emphasizing that the legislation should not apply to workers, Herbert Hoover, then
Secretary of Commerce, sent a letter to Congress on this point that was incorporated in the
records of both the 1923 Hearings and the 1924 Joint Hearings. Hoover characterized the
objection that had been raised as an objection Ato the inclusion of workers= contracts in the law=s
scheme.@44 He suggested clarification by using virtually the same language as that recommended
by Piatt, but with the addition of Arailroad employees@ to the list.45 The language in the Hoover
letter was the actual language added to the statute: Abut nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged

the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were those in which workers
were actually engaged in interstate commerce.@ (citations omitted).
41

See infra notes 43- 48 and accompanying text.

42

1923 Hearings, supra note 39, at 9.

43

Id.

44

1923 Hearings, supra note 39, at 14; Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 21.

45

1923 Hearings, supra note 39, at 14; Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 21.
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in foreign or interstate commerce.@46
Thus, the supporters of the legislation did not believe that it would apply to any workers at
all. Under the view of the commerce clause at that time, the Act did not apply to contracts of
most workers.47 It only applied to contracts of workers actually engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce, such as seamen or railroad employees, and those workers were specifically excluded.
Piatt explained that the act was Apurely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it.
Now that is all there is in this.@48 This was the central concept behind the act: to provide for
enforceability of arbitration agreements between merchants -- parties presumed to be of
approximately equal bargaining strength -- who needed a way to resolve their disputes
expeditiously and inexpensively.49
The hearings make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant arbitrations,
never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations. All of the examples given by Bernheimer as to cases
46

9 U.S.C. '1.

47

See supra, note 40 and accompanying text.

48

1923 Hearings, supra note 39, at 9.

49

As Bernheimer testified on behalf of all the business associations he represented:
The bill on the one hand aims to eliminate friction, delay, and
waste, and on the other to establish and maintain business amity... If
inexpensive but dependable arbitration were possible instead of costly,
time-consuming and troublesome litigation, the risk [of doing business]
would be correspondingly smaller and the price made to conform
therewith. Not only will the suggested law accomplish all of this, but it
will help to conserve perishable and semiperishable food products and
save many millions of dollars in foodstuffs now wasted because of the
lack of legally binding arbitration facilities.... The merchants want this
very badly. Id. at 3, 7.
11

he knew about or cases he had personally been involved with through the New York Chamber of
Commerce were cases between merchants. At one point in the hearings, Senator Walsh of
Montana raised the question whether the legislation would apply to contracts which were not
really voluntary, for example, where one party, such as an insurance company or a railroad
company, had much more bargaining power, and was able to provide a contract on a Atake it or
leave it@ basis.50 Piatt, who was testifying at the time, said,
I would not favor any kind of legislation that would permit the forcing a man to
sign that kind of a contract...I think that ought to be protested against, because it
is the primary end of this contract that it is a contract between merchants with one
another, buying and selling goods.51
Cohen was also asked to respond to a concern about adhesion contracts during the Joint
Hearings. The Chairman, Senator Sterling, first asked Cohen to explain the reason courts had not
been willing to enforce arbitration agreements. Cohen initially referred to the courts= concerns
about Aouster of jurisdiction,@52 but then acknowledged,
[T]he real fundamental cause was that at the time this rule was made people were
not able to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men
would take advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect
them. And the courts said, AIf you let the people sign away their rights, the
powerful people will come in and take away the rights of the weaker ones.@ And
that is still true to some extent.53
50

Id. at 9. AThe trouble about the matter is that a great many of these contracts that are
entered into are really not voluntary things at all.... It is the same with a good many contracts of
employment. A man says, AThese are out terms. All, right, take it or leave it.@ Well, there is
nothing for the man to do except to sign it; and then he surrenders his right to have his case tried
by the court, and has to have it tried before a tribunal in which he has no confidence at all.@ Id.
51
52
53

Id. at 10.
Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 14.
Id. at 15.
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Senator Sterling then quizzed Cohen specifically about whether this was not also the case with
respect to Atake it or leave it@ contracts between railroads and shippers. In response, Cohen
claimed that shippers were protected by the bills of lading act, and further, that
the Federal Government, through its regularly constituted bodies...protect[s]
everybody. Railroad contracts and express contracts and insurance contracts are
provided for. You cannot get a provision into an insurance contract today unless
it is approved by the insurance department. In other words, people are protected
today as never before.54
Cohen and his fellow supporters thus indicated that this bill would not apply in adhesion
contracts for several reasons. First, there were protections written into law; second, protective
requirements were issued by federal agencies; and third, that was simply not the intent of the
legislation, which was specifically aimed at voluntary resolution of disputes between merchants.
Arbitration was, as Alexander Rose noted, Aa purely voluntary thing. [The legislation] is only the
idea that arbitration may now have the aid of the court to enforce these provisions which men
voluntarily enter into.@55 The new law was not intended to permit a party with greater economic
strength to compel a weaker party to arbitrate. As Representative Graham noted in the House
Floor Debate in 1924, A[t]his bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an
opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts B an
agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it.@56
Representative Graham emphasized the narrow scope of the bill:

54
55
56

Id.
Id. at 36.
House Floor Debate, 65 Cong. Record 1931 (1924). Emphasis added.
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It does not involve any new principle of law except to provide a simple method
by which the parties may be brought before the court in order to give enforcement
to that which they have already agreed to . ..It creates no new legislation, grants
no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts
and admiralty contracts.57
Cohen=s final task was to assure Congress that it had the power and the authority to adopt
the legislation. Although this did not seem to be seriously in doubt, there had been a state and
federal constitutional challenge to the New York arbitration statute.58 That challenge had been
soundly rejected by the New York Court of Appeal in a decision by Judge Cardozo that Cohen
cited extensively in his brief.59 With respect to Congress= authority, Cohen asserted that it did
not depend upon the commerce or admiralty power. Rather,
[its authority] rests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress is
authorized to establish and control inferior Federal Courts. So far as congressional
acts relate to the procedure in the Federal courts they are clearly within the
congressional power. This principle is so evident and so firmly established that it
can not be seriously disputed.60
According to Cohen, since the arbitration act related solely to procedure in the Federal Courts,

57

Id.

58

Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc. 230 N.Y 261 (1921).

59

Id., cited in Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 39. There had also been a constitutional
question raised as to whether the New York statute could apply in an admiralty case to compel a
party to arbitrate. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Company, 264 U.S. 109 (1924). The U.S.
Supreme Court held that New York state was free to provide for specific performance of
contractual arbitration clauses because the statutory remedy sought did not change the
substantive admiralty law or attempt to govern the remedy in admiralty court. Id. at 124.
60

Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37. Cohen cited to Art I, section 8, of the U.S.
Constitution, which gives Congress power Ato constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court,@
and Art III sections 1 and 2, which provided that AThe judicial power of the United States shall
be vested...in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.@
Id.
14

the question of whether there was authority under the commerce clause was not at issue.61
Cohen noted that the proposed law, by simply declaring the policy of recognizing and
enforcing arbitration agreements in the Federal courts, Adoes not encroach upon the province of
the individual States.@62 He then speculated, however, that Congress probably does have Aample
power to declare that all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce or admiralty
transactions shall be recognized as valid and enforceable even by the State Courts.@63 Having
made the argument that Congress probably had broad authority under the commerce clause to
enact the statute, Cohen concluded, however, that even if it were found that Congress had no
such power, it would not affect the current statute. Because the primary purpose of the statute
was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in the Federal courts, Congress therefore Arests
solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts.@64
It did not appear that members of the Joint Subcommittees hearing testimony on the bill
were too concerned about their authority. At one point, this brief conversation took place
between Representative Dyer and the Chairman, Senator Sterling:
Dyer: AThere is no question of the authority of Congress to legislate on this
subject as provided in the bill, is there?@
Chairman: AI do not think there is.@
Dyer: AThe authority and jurisdiction is ample?@
61

Id. Cohen specifically noted that in declaring arbitration agreements to be valid, the
statute was not declaring their existence as a matter of substantive law. Id. at 38.
62

Id. at 38.

63

Id.

64

Id.
15

Chairman: AYes.@65
There was, however, no discussion among the Committee members as to what constituted the
basis for that authority and jurisdiction. The sole discussion is found in Cohen=s brief, attached
to the proceedings. The Committee Report for the House, however, states that
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether an agreement for
arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure to be determined by
the law court in which the proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law
to be determined by the law of the forum in which the contract is made. Before
such contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this law is
essential.66
The House Report suggests that Congress clearly had the power to pass a procedural act whose
purpose is to enforce contracts in federal courts. The Report continued, however, by noting that
Athe remedy is founded also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and over
admiralty.@67 By use of the word Aalso,@ the reference to the commerce and admiralty power
appears to be a fall-back position, a secondary basis of power. The passage as a whole makes
clear that Committee members saw the arbitration act as Cohen presented it: a statute providing
for enforcement, and therefore relating to remedies, which meant a procedural, not a substantive
statute, and one that related only to procedures in Federal Court.68 Such a statute was well

65

Id. at 24.

66

H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 1 (1924) (hereinafter, AHouse Report@).

67

Id. at 2. Emphasis added.

68

See Joint Hearings, supra, note 16, at 39-40. See also David S. Schwartz, Correcting
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration
Act, 67 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, 17 (2004) (noting that at the time of the FAA enactment, Aboth
remedial and procedural matters were deemed to be lex fori - the law of the court - rather than lex
loci - the substantive law of the jurisdiction@) citing Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co, 264
16

within Congress= authority to establish and control Federal Courts.69
Having been passed without a single negative vote in either the House or the Senate, the
Federal Arbitration Act was signed into law in 1925, and became effective January 1, 1926.70
Cohen immediately took steps to educate the legal public about the Act, publishing an article on
The New Arbitration Law in February, 1926.71 He essentially incorporated into the article the
brief he provided to Congress, but he changed emphasis somewhat, adapting his text to a
different audience-- attorneys and law professors. First, Cohen devoted more argument to the
fact that the statute provides Aimprovement of ...procedural remedies,@ noting that changes in
procedure are Asponsored by the legal profession in the interest of the better administration of
justice,@ and that the new statute Ais simply a new procedural remedy, particularly adapted to the
settlement of commercial disputes.@72 Second, he put more emphasis on the voluntary nature of
the application of the Act. ANo one is required to make an agreement to arbitrate. Such action by
a party is entirely voluntary...[The new arbitration law] is merely a new method for enforcing a
contract freely made by the parties thereto.@73 Third, and most important, Cohen, the great
proponent and activist for arbitration, made a strong argument to the legal community that

U.S. at 122-23 (1924) (Brandeis, J.) (AThe [New York] Arbitration Law deals merely with the
remedy in the state courts@) and Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290 (1921)
(Cardozo, J.) (AArbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be settled.@)
69

See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.

70

See infra note 79.

71

Julius Cohen, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 Va. L. Rev. 265 (1925-26).

72

Id. at 279.

73

Id.
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arbitration has limitations and should not be misused. Arbitration was a remedy that was wellsuited, according to Cohen,
to the dispositions of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of
fact B quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment,
excuses for non-performance, and the like. It has a place also in the determination
of the simpler questions of law Bthe questions of law which arise out of these
daily relations between merchants as to the passage of title, the existence of
warranties, or [related] questions of law....74
On the other hand, Cohen noted that not all questions arising out of contracts should be
arbitrated. Arbitration should not, for example, be used to resolve more complex issues.
Specifically, Cohen informed his fellow members of the profession that arbitration was Anot the
proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving constitutional questions
or policy in the application of statutes.@75 These kinds of question were not within the particular
experience of arbitrators, and thus were Abetter left to the determination of skilled judges with a
background of legal experience and established systems of law.@76 Although Cohen had not
expressly made this argument to Congress, he and others had testified at the Hearings as to the
limited nature of the bill. And Cohen=s position in the article is consistent with his position
before Congress, because the case he and others made to Congress was exactly what Cohen
described in his article as the proper use of arbitration -- to resolve heavily fact-based disputes
between merchants, Awhere all meet upon a common ground.@77
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Id. at 281.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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We know from the legislative history and from contemporary writings what the reformers
wanted, what they believed the Act would accomplish, and what they told the members of
Congress the legislation was intended to accomplish. The purpose of the arbitration act was
primarily to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court,78 and secondarily to
provide procedures that would make this enforcement process simple and expeditious, thereby
enabling merchants to resolve their disputes more cheaply and easily. The FAA was a bill of
limited scope, intended to apply in disputes between merchants of approximately equal
economic strength, over questions arising out of their daily relations. The bill was not the result
of trade-offs or strategic compromises, because it was essentially unopposed.79 The FAA would
only apply when arbitration was voluntarily agreed to by the parties. According to Cohen, its
leading proponent and principal drafter, the legislation was to apply to disputes involving facts
and simple questions of law, not statutory or constitutional issues, since arbitration was simply
not a proper method for deciding points of law of major importance. The legislation would not
apply to workers or labor disputes. Because the statute dealt with enforcement, and therefore
simply ensured a remedy, it was a procedural statute, and only applied in federal courts. It would
not affect state law or state courts in any way. It was this limited statute that the Congress of
78

Of course, for the parties to be in federal court there had to be some basis of federal
jurisdiction other than the arbitration agreement. See infra notes 201-202.
79

Statement of Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 13 (AMr.
Chairman, the question was asked, who opposes this bill? There is no open opposition
anywhere.@). Earlier opposition by seamen and railroad employees had been diffused when a
provision was added excluding them from coverage of the Act. See infra notes 310-311 and
accompanying text. The ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, noted in
an article published in the ABA Journal in 1925, immediately after the bill=s passage, that Anot a
single dissenting vote was registered in either House or Senate.@ The United States Arbitration
Law and Its Application, 11 ABA J. 153 (1925).
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1925 believed it was enacting. We will see, however, that our courts have turned this legislation
into something else entirely.
Today, the statute which was enacted as a procedural statute effective only in federal court
has been interpreted to apply to states80 and to pre-empt state law that conflicts with the Court=s
interpretation of the FAA.81 A state statute which attempts to protect citizens by regulation of the
use of arbitration is preempted unless the specific arbitration clause can be shown to be
unconscionable. The Court, for example, struck down as pre-empted by the FAA a Montana
statute which required notice of an arbitration clause to be given on the front page of any
contract.82 In addition, although the FAA was never meant to apply to consumers, and was not
supposed to apply except when parties consented knowingly and voluntarily, the Court has
upheld application of arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts.83 And despite Julius Cohen=s
admonition that arbitration should not apply to anything other than the heavily factual disputes
between merchants in their relations with each other, and that arbitration should not be used to
resolve complicated legal issues, the Court has determined that rights created under federal
statutes, such as securities laws, antitrust laws and anti-discrimination statutes, can be adequately
protected by the arbitration process.84 Moreover, even workers who were specifically excluded
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Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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Dr=s Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996)
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Id.
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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), Allied Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995)
84

Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
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by the language of the FAA, have, through the interpretative processes of the Court, been found
to be covered, so that employers may compel their employees to agree to arbitrate any disputes if
they want to be hired.85 Additionally, individuals have been held to agreements they have not
signed and not even read, even though enforcement means they have waived a constitutional
right to a jury trial without knowledge or consent.86 And finally, the Court has suggested that
waiver of a class action arbitration, in an adhesion contract, is probably enforceable if that is
what was intended by the parties.87
The Court has, step by step, built a house of cards that has almost no resemblance to the
structure envisioned by the original statute. Each card put in place by the Court builds on the
prior flimsy court-created structure. The edifice we have today incorporates policies and
practices that were never considered or developed by our legislative branch, and in fact goes far
beyond and even against what the1925 Congress enacted. The consistent effect of the Court=s
interpretation, as will be developed below, is to diminish individual rights, to significantly reduce
access to the courts and the right to a jury trial, and to favor strong economic interests at the
expense of the weaker party to an extent not seen since the Lochner Court of the early 1900's.88

Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989), Gilmer, supra note 83.
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Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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See Sternlight, supra note 6.
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Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
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In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) the court struck down protective state
legislation providing that no laborer could be required or permitted to work in a bakery more than
sixty hours in a week or ten hours in a day, holding this was not a legitimate exercise of the police
power of the State, but an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and
liberty of the individual to contract in relation to his labor, and as such was in conflict with, and
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This article will document how a simple procedural statute attained such an expansive
reach without any further legislative enactments, and will discuss the implications of this form of
judicial lawmaking. The next sections of this article will consider the landmark cases in which
the Court=s interpretation of the FAA resulted in an entirely different statute from the one enacted
in 1925.
II.

Prima Paint and the Post-Erie Dilemma
A. The Impact of Erie v. Tomkins89
There are several stages in the transformation of the original FAA into the expansive

statute it is today. A critical turning point was in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin,90 where the
Court had to decide, post-Erie, whether a federal court could apply the FAA in a diversity case.
Cases leading up to Prima Paint show a development moving logically but not inevitably to the
result in that decision.
The Erie decision in 1938 declared that there was no general federal common law, and
thus required federal courts in diversity cases to enforce the common law as determined by the
state in which they were located.91 Erie held that in a diversity case a federal court must apply
state substantive law, but federal procedural law. That decision overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.)1 (1842), under which, for almost a century, a federal court having jurisdiction of a

void under, the Federal Constitution.
89

Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

90

388 U.S. 395 (1967).

91

Id.
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case because of diversity of citizenship did not have to apply the unwritten law, that is, the
common law, of the State in which it sat. Rather, when the common or general law applied, a
federal court could use its own independent judgment as to what the law was or should be.92
Under Swift v. Tyson, non-statutory law had been considered a unitary Atranscendental body of
law outside of any particular state,@ and a A>brooding omnipresence= of Reason,@ and federal
courts considered themselves free to determine what Reason, and therefore what law, was
required.93
Under Erie, the FAA, which was considered a procedural statute, would still be
applicable in a diversity case. In Guaranty Trust v. York, however, the Court clarified Erie by
saying that it is not the application of the labels Asubstantive@ or Aprocedural@ that determines
whether state or federal law should be applied.94 Instead, if the application of federal law would
produce a different outcome from the application of state law, then the federal court must apply
state law.95
Thus, the Supreme Court came to be faced with the question whether a federal court
decision to require arbitration was outcome determinative. In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company,96 a wrongful discharge case that was removed to federal court in Vermont on
diversity grounds, the issue was whether the FAA applied, therefore requiring enforcement of the
92

See id. at 71.
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Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102-103 (1945).

94

Id. at 109.

95
96

Id.
350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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parties= agreement to arbitrate.97 Vermont law appeared to permit parties to revoke an arbitration
agreement at any point prior to the award.98 Application of the FAA would permit a court to stay
judicial proceedings so the arbitration could go forward. The question whether the FAA or
Vermont law governed in this diversity case appeared to be squarely before the Court. However,
the Court initially dodged the issue by determining that the contract at issue -- an employment
contract -- was not covered by Section 2 of the FAA because it was not Aa contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce.@99 The Court therefore denied the stay of judicial proceedings
provided for in Section 3 of the Act,100 because Section 3 proceedings were only available for
contracts which fit under Section 2. Thus, since the FAA was inapplicable, Vermont law
applied, making the arbitration agreement unenforceable.
The Court could have stopped there, but it did not. It went on to discuss whether Aapart
from the Federal Act, a provision of a contract providing for arbitration is enforceable in a
diversity case.@ 101 This is a curious statement, since apart from the Federal Act, federal courts
had not been willing to enforce arbitration agreements. Apparently, however, the Court was
nonetheless considering whether, absent applicability of the FAA, a judge-made federal
procedural rule could require arbitration in a diversity case, despite a contrary state rule.102 In
97

Id.
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Id. at 199-200.

99

9.U.S.C. '2.

100

9.U.S.C. '3.

101

350 U.S. at 202.
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For a fuller discussion of this point, see Schwartz, supra note 68 at 33.
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considering whether a decision to require arbitration was outcome determinative, the Court
emphasized the differences in arbitration and litigation, concluding that Athe change from a court
of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.@103 It therefore
concluded that such a judge-made federal rule would be outcome determinative, requiring that a
conflicting state law on arbitration would have to be applied. Thus, a federal court could not
impose arbitration in a diversity case where a state rule conflicted with a judge-made federal
rule. However, because this finding was not necessary to the holding of the case, it was dicta, and
did not establish that the FAA could not apply in diversity cases. Nonetheless, Justice
Frankfurter, in his concurrence, opined that because differences in arbitration and litigation can
affect the outcome of a case, the FAA was not applicable to diversity cases.104
A main purpose of the FAA, of course, was to require enforcement of arbitration agreements
in diversity cases.105 That purpose, and therefore the FAA itself, would be undermined if parties
from states like New York, which required arbitration agreements to be enforced, could not
enforce such agreements in federal court against parties from states like Vermont, which
permitted revocation. Although the Court in Bernhardt side-stepped the issue by finding the
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305 U.S. at 203. AThe nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of
the parcel of rights behind a cause of action...Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury that is
guaranteed both by the Seventh Amendment and by ... the Vermont Constitution. Arbitrators do
not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their
results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial
review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial...@ Id. (citations omitted).
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350 U.S. at 208.
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See 388 U.S. 395, 418 (Black, dissenting) (A...[T]o hold the act inapplicable in
diversity cases would be severely to limit its impact.@)
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contract in question not covered by the FAA, it was only a matter of time before the question of
FAA applicability in a diversity case involving a contract in interstate commerce would arise.
Eleven years later, the Court faced that question head-on in Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin.106
B. Prima Paint
Prima Paint involved the interstate sale of a business and an accompanying consulting
contract.107 The main thrust of the opinion was whether a court or an arbitrator would determine
Prima Paint=s claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract.108 The Court decided that under
the FAA, if the fraud at issue was alleged to be in the formation of the contract, as opposed to
being in the formation of the arbitration agreement, an arbitrator would determine the issue.109 A
contrary result would obtain under New York law, which apparently required that a court
determine the issue of fraudulent inducement, regardless of whether the fraud was in the contract
itself or in the arbitration agreement.110 In other words, if the FAA applied, litigation would be
stayed under section 3, and the arbitrator would determine the inducement issue. If New York
law applied, the court would make this determination. Thus, the question was squarely put
whether, in light of Bernhardt=s declaration that a decision to arbitrate was outcome
determinative, the federal court could apply the FAA in a diversity case, or whether it must defer
to state law.
106

388 U.S. 395 (1967).

107

388 U.S. at 397.

108

Id. at 396.
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Id. at 403-04.

110

Id. at 410-11 (Black, dissenting).
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Prima Paint presented a real dilemma. If the Court applied Bernhardt=s Aoutcome
determinative@ test, and followed Frankfurter=s concurring opinion that the FAA was
Asubstantive@ under the Erie test so that it should not apply in diversity cases, the result would
emasculate the FAA and thwart the intent of the 1925 Congress.111
The easiest solution might have been suggested by Hanna v. Plumer, 112 decided two years
earlier. In Hanna, the Court determined that a Federal Rule on service of process would apply in
federal court rather than a conflicting state rule, regardless of whether application of the federal
rule would affect the outcome.113 In more recent times, the Court in Stewart v. Ricoh has made
clear that if there is a valid federal rule enacted under the Rules Enabling Act, or a federal statute
on point, that rule or statute applies in a diversity case.114 In other words, if Congress has spoken
on the issue, then the outcome determinative test of Guaranty Trust would not come into play. If
Congress has not spoken, and a federal judge-made rule conflicts with state law in a diversity
case, then the outcome determinative test must be applied.115
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See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of
Arbitration Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1305, 1320 (1985)(ABy declaring enforcement of arbitration to be
>substantive= in effect, the Bernhardt decision shut off the option of treating the FAA as a rule of
federal procedure without significance in the Erie scheme@).
112

380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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Id. at 473. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are adopted by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the delegation by Congress under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. '2072. 380 U.S.
at 463-64.
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Stewart v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 27 (1988) (A...a district court sitting in diversity must
apply a federal statute that controls the issue before the court and that represents a valid exercise
of Congress= constitutional powers@). See also, Erwin Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION
(1999), at 320.
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326 U.S. at 109. See also Ricoh, at 27, n.6, citing Hanna v. Plumer at 468 (AIf no
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The question, then, is why, after Hanna, didn=t the Court in Prima Paint simply say the
FAA applies because it is a validly enacted federal statute on point in this case? The reason
appears to be that at the time of Bernhardt and Prima Paint, the Court was concerned about the
constitutional power of Congress to enact rules that were applicable to substantive areas of state
law, such as contracts, in a diversity case.116 Language in Erie suggested that the Article III
power to control federal courts did not give Congress the right to create rules which affected
substantive areas of state law.117 It was only in Ricoh that those concerns were resolved in favor
of Congressional power. Thus, as the courts in Bernhardt and its progeny viewed Erie, for the
FAA to apply in a diversity case, the statute must have been based on Congress= power under the
commerce clause.
Prior to Prima Paint, the Second Circuit, in Robert Lawrence v. Devonshire,118 had
faced the dilemma raised by Bernhardt. On facts similar to those in Prima Paint, the Robert
Lawrence court found the arbitration clause was severable from the rest of contract, and that

federal statute or rule [is applicable], the district court proceeds to evaluate whether application of
a federal judge-made law would disserve... Athe twin aims of Erie: discouragement of forumshopping and avoidance of the inequitable administration of the laws.@
116

Bernhard, 350 U.S. at 203, emphasized that in enforcing a state-created contract right
in a diversity case, the federal court is in essence Aonly another court of the State@, citing
Guaranty Trust, at 108. It further noted that Athe federal court therefore may not >substantially
affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State,=@citing Guaranty Trust at 109.
117

The Erie Court stated, AThere is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state...And no clause in the
constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.@ 304 U.S. at 78. See
Hirshman, supra note 111, at 1317.
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271 F.2d 402 (1959).
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arbitrators would decide the issue of fraud in the inducement of that contract.119 The court dealt
with the potential constitutional issue by finding a congressional intent Ato create a new body of
federal substantive law affecting the validity and interpretation of arbitration agreements...@120,
and by asserting that Congress based the Arbitration Act Ain part on its undisputed substantive
powers over commerce and maritime matters.@121 The Second Circuit therefore broadly held that
the Arbitration Act created Anational law equally applicable in state or federal courts,@122 which
encompassed Aquestions of interpretation and construction as well as questions of validity,
revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting interstate commerce or
maritime affairs...@123
Since the two lower court opinions in Prima Paint expressly relied on the reasoning of
Robert Lawrence in reaching their decisions,124 Prima Paint at its core was a review of the
Robert Lawrence holding. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the result in Robert
Lawrence, it did not approve the broad scope of the decision. It stated that the question was not
Awhether Congress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in simple
diversity cases@ but rather, Awhether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct
119

Id at 410, 412.
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Id. at 404.
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Id. at 407.
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Id. The court acknowledged that in other contexts, Aenforceability of an arbitration
agreement had generally been considered to be procedural only@ at 405, and that the point about
the law being substantive and applying in state or federal court Ahas only rarely been noticed,@ at
407.
123

Id.
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themselves with respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has the power to
legislate.@125 The question concerning Awhether Congress may prescribe how federal courts are
to conduct themselves@126 suggests the Court viewed application of the FAA as fundamentally
procedural. Nonetheless, the remaining clause appears to move closer to a substantive
interpretation, by referring to Asubject matter over which Congress plainly has power to
legislate.@127 While the meaning is somewhat oblique, one implication is that while Congress had
the power to legislate over the subject matter at issue, it had not done so. What Congress
specifically had not done was create federal subject matter jurisdiction when it enacted the
FAA.128 That Congress did not create subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts for the FAA
suggests that the law was not intended to provide any substantive rights. Because Bernhardt
announced that enforcement of arbitration entailed substantive rights, the question became
whether these substantive rights were constitutional.
Perhaps, in referring to subject matter over which Congress had power to legislate (that
was unexercised), the Court in Prima Paint was referencing the dormant commerce clause. This
124

See 360 F.2d 315 (1966), and 262 F. Supp. 605 (1966).
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Prima Paint at 405.
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Id.
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Id.
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For a party to go to federal court on a claim under the FAA, there must be a separate
basis of federal jurisdiction, such as diversity. 9 U.S.C. '4 makes this clear: A A party aggrieved
by the alleged failure...of another to arbitrate under a written agreement...may petition any United
States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28....@
The Court in Southland stated that Athe Federal Arbitration Act...does not create any independent
federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S. C. '1331 or otherwise.@ 465 U.S. at 16, citing Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25, n.32 (1983).
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is an analogous area of constitutional jurisprudence where the Court interprets and applies the
interstate commerce clause in the absence of Congressional enactments based on that clause.
From early in our history, the federal courts have been active under the interstate commerce
clause to protect the national economy from interference by state laws burdening commerce.129
Dormant commerce cases have arisen, inter alia, in situations like the FAA, where Congress had
power to enact substantive law, but had not done so.130 Thus, although Congress did not grant
federal subject matter jurisdiction over arbitration contracts in interstate commerce, the Court
was perhaps assuming that Congress= inherent power to do so provided the Court with the ability
to apply the FAA, even if quasi-substantive, in a diversity case.131
Ultimately, however, the Court in Prima Paint, adopted Robert Lawrence=s basic
solution. Federal law could prevail in a diversity case because Ait is clear beyond dispute that the
federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incontestable federal foundations of
>control over interstate commerce and over admiralty.=@132 By asserting that the FAA is Abased
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See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (Commerce Clause is an
independent limit on state power, even where Congress has not acted).
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See, e.g. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Even though there was
no federal law regulating permissible length of trains, Arizona Train Limits Law struck down for
imposing serious burden on interstate commerce).
131

Seventeen years later, in Southland v. Keating, Chief Justice Burger referred
specifically to Gibbons v. Ogden, supra note 118, noting that Congress= Aplenary@ authority under
the Commerce Clause provided the power for Prima Paint to have Aclearly implied that the
substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.@ 465 U.S. 1 at 11-12.
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388 U.S. at 405, citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. Rep. No.
5365, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
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upon and confined to@ Congress= interstate commerce and admiralty powers,133 however, the
Court ignored specific and repeated references in the legislative history to Congress=
constitutional power to control federal courts as the basis for the FAA,134 thereby misconstruing
the legislative history of the FAA quite significantly.135 Julius Cohen=s brief, which was
incorporated in the record of the Joint Hearings of House and Senate Subcommittees, made two
points very clearly. First, the FAA Arelate[s] solely to procedure of the Federal courts.@136 Second,
Congress= power to adopt the statute Arests upon the constitutional provision by which Congress
is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.@137 This power, according to Cohen,
comes from Article III, sections 1 and 2, giving Congress the power to establish inferior courts,
and from the necessary and proper clause of Article I section 8.138 In his congressional testimony,
Cohen put it more simply: AThe theory on which you do this [provide for federal court
enforcement of arbitration agreements] is that you have the right to tell the Federal courts how to
proceed.@139
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See id.
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See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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In a footnote, the Court acknowledged that perhaps the 1925 Congress did not see its
jurisdiction as completely Aconfined@ to its control of interstate commerce and admiralty, because,
before Erie, which came down in 1938, Congress may have believed it had power to create rules
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Moreover, the Senate and House Committee Reports do not support a finding that the
commerce and admiralty powers were the exclusive bases of power to enact the FAA, although
cited by the Court for that proposition.140 The Senate Report does not state what the basis is, and
the House Report refers to federal control over interstate commerce and admiralty as a fall-back,
after determining that arbitration enforcement is properly a subject of federal control because it is
a matter of procedure to be determined in federal court, and not one of substantive law.141
The Court did not go so far as to say, like the Robert Lawrence court, that the FAA
represented national law equally applicable in state or federal courts, or that it encompassed
questions of interpretation, construction, validity, revocability as well as enforceability of
arbitration. Rather, the Court in Prima Paint asserted that the FAA text, in section 4, provided an
explicit answer to the question of severability. By framing its decision in terms of an explicit
answer found in the text, the Court appeared to be trying to avoid the full breadth of the Robert
Lawrence approach.142
In Prima Paint, the Court reached a pragmatic result, but used an unfortunate method
to get there. From one perspective, the decision may appear to be a good example of dynamic
statutory interpretation. That view says a judge may legitimately interpret a statute in a way that
goes beyond or even against the original purpose or intent, if justified by changes in current
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388 U.S. at 405, citing H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 1 (1924); S. Rep. No.
5365, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 3 (1924).
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See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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In his dissent, however, Justice Black pointed out that AThe Court thus holds that the
Arbitration Act, designed to provide merely a procedural remedy,...authorizes federal courts to
fashion a federal rule to make arbitration clauses >separable= and valid.@ 388 U.S. at 411.
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circumstances or mores.143 As Professor William Eskridge has noted, from the time of
Blackstone, there has been recognition that judges have the power to adapt statutes to changing
circumstances, to consider the reason and the spirit of the statute.144 Certainly the Prima Paint
Court appears to have adapted the FAA to a change in circumstances B the sea change brought
about by Erie and Guaranty Trust B and interpreted the statute in a way that preserved the intent
of the enacting Congress to apply the statute in federal court in diversity cases.
There are two problems, however, with the methodology used by the Court to reach this
result. First, it wrongly characterized legislative history, and second, it did not specifically limit
its decision. In incorrectly claiming in1967 that the underlying power Congress relied upon in
1925 was exclusively the commerce clause, the Court supplied a basis for arguing that Congress
intended to create broad substantive rights in enacting the FAA, which would pre-empt state
substantive rights. This is, of course, entirely contrary to the legislative history.145
The Court at the very least should have been much more specific about the limitations
inherent in the rationale for its decision, rather than leaving it open to be expansively
misconstrued in subsequent cases. For example, it could have made clear in the majority decision
what Justice Black stated in dissent, that Congress never intended the FAA to apply to states.146

143

William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, pp. 10-11.
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Id. at 424 (Black dissenting) (AThe Court here does not hold today...that the body of
federal substantive law created by federal judges under the Arbitration Act is required to be
applied by state courts. A holding to that effect B which the Court seems to leave up in the air B
would flout the intention of the framers of the Act.@)
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It could also have more specifically limited to the extent to which it viewed the statute as
providing substantive rights. Instead, by its misuse of legislative history, and its failure to limit
the decision to reflect the limited scope of the FAA, the Prima Paint Court unleashed the statute
from its moorings, and sent it on a journey from which it has never returned.
III. Prima Paint=s Expansive Progeny: Moses H. Cone and Southland.
Although Prima Paint had avoided a specific finding that the FAA was a substantive
statute that could be applied in state court,147 sixteen years later, in Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,148 the Court caverlierly stated in dicta, without citing to
support or authority, that the FAA created a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, and
that the FAA governed in either state or federal court.149 In Moses H. Cone, the hospital had
sued a construction company in state court. The construction company petitioned in federal court
for an order compelling arbitration under section 4 of the FAA. The federal district court stayed
the federal court suit pending resolution of the state court suit, but the federal court of appeals, en
banc, reversed the stay order and remanded to the district court for an entry of an order
compelling arbitration. The main focus of the U.S. Supreme Court=s decision was on the question
of abstention: should the federal suit be stayed out of deference to the parallel litigation in state
court? In answering that question in the negative, the Court found that the district court=s stay of
147

See O=Connor, J. (dissent) in Southland, 465 U.S. at 24 ( A[T]he Prima Paint decision
>carefully avoided any explicit endorsement of the view that the Arbitration Act embodied
substantive policies that were to be applied to all contracts within its scope, whether sued on in
state or federal courts.=@) citing Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
731-32 (2d ed. 1973).
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the federal suit had thwarted Congress= clear intent Ato move parties...into arbitration as quickly
and easily as possible...The stay thus frustrated the statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed
enforcement of arbitration agreements.@150 Although this sufficed to decide the case, the Court
went on inexplicably to declare that Section 2 of the FAA not only created substantive law, but
that it applied in either state or federal court.151
Moreover, the Court also emphasized in Moses H. Cone, without citing any authority, that
there is a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. In fact, however, nothing in the legislative
history suggests a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. The 1925 Congress never indicated
in the slightest way that arbitration was to be favored over judicial resolution of disputes. It
simply made arbitration of commercial and maritime agreements enforceable in federal court,
because until 1925, such agreements had essentially been revokable at will by the parties.152 At
no point did anyone argue that arbitration was overall a superior method of resolving disputes.
Rather, Congress was persuaded that where merchants were concerned, arbitration provided a
less expensive option that should be made available to those who voluntarily agreed to this
alternative. The Act, therefore, would provide enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. However,
there appears to be no basis for Justice Brennan to state that ASection 2 is a congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements@ 153 and that A[t]he
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
150

Id. at 22-23.

151

Id.
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See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

153

460 U.S. at 24. Emphasis added.
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arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration...@154
The so-called Apolicy favoring arbitration@ appears to be one created by the judiciary out
of whole cloth. A possible explanation for its creation, however, is that the Court may have
indiscriminately superimposed on the FAA the national labor policy favoring collective
bargaining agreements. Indeed, just a few year after the Court made the above statements in
Moses H. Cone, the Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth155 cited not
only Moses H. Cone for the proposition that Aany doubts..should be resolved in favor of
arbitration@, but also Steelworker v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 156 a labor arbitration case,
perhaps in order to shore up the lack of authority for the statement in Moses H. Cone. In the
Steelworker case, the Court, interpreting §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, stated,
[T]he judicial inquiry under 301 must be strictly confined to the question whether
the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance.... An order to arbitrate the
particular grievance should not be denied unless ... the arbitration clause is not
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage.157
So the policy announced as a federal policy with regard to the FAA, was instead, a policy
pertaining to the labor law field.158 In that field, there are strong national policy justifications for
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Id.
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473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).

157

Id.
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See Schwartz, supra, note 68 at 41, who argued that not only was there a Anationalist
pull of federal labor law on the FAA,@, but also that civil rights-oriented judicial nationalism may
have caused Justice Brennan to make the sweeping statements set forth in Moses H. Cone,
because he and some of his colleagues may have seen the rejection of a federal court=s stay of
litigation in deference to a state court Aas an opportunity to make good civil rights law in the
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favoring arbitration of collective bargaining agreements - to prevent strikes and worker violence,
to preserve labor peace and to promote industrial stabilization.159 These policy reasons do not
pertain to the FAA, which simply provides that arbitration of commercial and maritime disputes
can be a workable alternative to litigation.160
Because the Moses H. Cone Court had already announced in dicta that the FAA governed
in state and federal court, the majority of justices in Southland v. Keating,161 which was decided
approximately one year later, probably did not think they were taking a very big step in holding
that the FAA pre-empted state law. In fact, however, this was a giant leap in the misconstruction
coded form of neutral procedural and prudential rules.@ Id. at 43.
159

See id. at 43-44. (A...[t]he analogy between federal labor policy and the FAA is faulty.
Arbitration pursuant to collective bargaining agreements is a part of a substantive national labor
policy. It is a quid pro quo for a union=s giving up the right to strike, and therefore a >stabilizing=
and >therapeutic= influence that promotes >industrial stabilization= and >industrial peace=
nationwide. Arbitration pursuant to the FAA is simply an alternative to litigation.@
160

Some courts have applied the FAA to labor arbitration agreements, see e.g. Tenney
Engineering v. United Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3rd Cir. 1953) (en
banc), but this runs counter to legislative history and to Supreme Court decisions that did not
apply the FAA to labor contracts. See e.g. Textile Worker Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957), where Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, points out that the majority implicitly held that the
FAA did not apply to labor arbitrations:
“... I find rejection, though not explicit, of the availability of the Federal
Arbitration Act to enforce arbitration clauses in collective-bargaining agreements
in the silent treatment given that Act by the Court's opinion. If an Act that
authorizes the federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in contracts
generally, but specifically denies authority to decree that remedy for >contracts of
employment,= were available, the Court would hardly spin such power out of the
empty darkness of '301. I would make this rejection explicit, recognizing that when
Congress passed legislation to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced by the
federal courts, it saw fit to exclude this remedy with respect to labor contracts.” Id.
at 466.
161

465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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of the FAA. Prima Paint, Moses H. Cone, and Southland, started the Court down a path of
creating its own statute, one entirely different from the statute enacted by Congress.
The question in Southland -- whether the California Franchise Investment Law, which did
not allow arbitration of claims arising under that law, was pre-empted by the FAA -- did not
appear to be a difficult decision for the majority. One factor that made the decision easier than it
should have been was that the appellees in Southland had assumed, based on the Moses H. Cone
dicta, that the FAA applied to the states. Because the appellees conceded this point in their brief,
the issue was not vigorously debated.162 The Court asserted in Southland that the decision in
Prima Paint Afinding the Arbitration Act was an exercise of Commerce Clause power, clearly
implied that the substantive rules of the Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts.@163 It
then noted that Moses H. Cone had expressly stated Awhat was implicit in Prima Paint, i.e., the
substantive law the Act created was applicable in state and federal courts.@164
Almost all of the commentators who have written about Southland, and several justices,
agree that this case was wrongly decided and inconsistent with Congressional intent.165 Yet there
were six justices in the majority, with Justice Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part,
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See Brief of Appellees in No. 82-500 (filed June 6, 1983) at 25, n. 30; see also Brief
Amici Curiae of State Attorneys General in Allied Bruce Terminix, No. 93-1001, 1993 U.S.
Briefs 1001, p. 2 (1994); Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203 (1982).
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465 U.S. at 12.

164

Id. at 12.
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See e.g. Schwartz, supra, note 68. See also infra note 193. One commentator who has
attempted to support the decision in Southland is Professor Christopher Drahozal, In Defense of
Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 101 (2002). See infra note 193.
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and only Justices O=Connor and Rehnquist taking full issue with the Court=s decision. To reach
its decision, the Court had to virtually ignore the legislative history that it nonetheless claimed to
rely upon. Although stating that the legislative history is Anot without ambiguities,@166 the Court
found that it supported an intent by Congress for the FAA to bind state courts as well as federal
courts.167 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger asserted that the FAA was based on
Congress= authority under the Commerce Clause to enact substantive rules, that Congress had
the power under the Commerce Clause to make the FAA applicable in state as well as federal
courts, and that it impliedly did so when it enacted the FAA.168 Chief Justice Burger also
suggested that a broader purpose of making the FAA apply in state courts could be inferred from
the fact that the contracts referred to are those involving interstate commerce. According to the
Chief Justice, Aif Congress...was creating what it thought to be a procedural rule applicable only
in federal courts, it would not so limit the Act to transactions involving commerce.@169
These points represent at best pure speculation which a fair reading of the legislative
history quickly undercuts. As Professor Schwartz has pointed out, language in the bill
concerning contracts involving commerce was amended at the request of Senator Walsh, who
wanted to narrow the effect of the Act, not expand it.170 The original bill introduced in Congress
provided coverage of three categories: Aany contract or maritime transaction or transaction
166

Id. at 12

167

Id. at 12-14.

168

See id. at 11-12

169

Id. at 14.

170

See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 21-22.
40

involving commerce.@171 The application of the FAA to Aany contract@ would have included
contracts not in interstate commerce.172 At the time, contracts not considered in interstate
commerce included most employment contracts and insurance contracts.173 Senator Walsh=s
amendment limited contracts covered by the act to Acontracts evidencing a transaction involving
commerce.@174 His clear intent was to prevent the application of the FAA to contracts such as
those of insurance and employment, which he considered adhesion contracts.175 Thus, by limiting
the scope of the FAA to contracts which were actually considered in interstate commerce,
Congress was reducing the reach of the bill, not expanding it to apply in state courts.
The speculation that Congress had a broader purpose than just creating a remedy in
federal courts is repeatedly shown to be unwarranted in the numerous representations that the
statute would not apply to the states,176 that it was only a procedural statute,177 and that there
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S. 4214, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., '2 (1922); H.R. 646, 65 Cong. Rec. 11,081 (1924).
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At the time, the FAA could only apply to Aany contract@ if it were a procedural statute.
See Schwartz supra note 68 at 21.
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See id. at 22, n. 107.

174

See id, n.102.
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1923 Hearings, supra note 39, at 9 (Remarks of Senator Walsh) (AThe trouble about the
matter is that a great many of these contracts that are entered into are really not voluntarily [sic]
things at all. Take an insurance policy.. You can take that or you can leave it...It is the same with a
good many contracts of employment...@).
176

See e.g. House Report, supra note 66, at 1-2 (ABefore [arbitration] agreements could
be enforced in the Federal courts...this law is essential...The bill declares simply such agreements
for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their
enforcement.@) emphasis added; see also Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 39 (Cohen Statement)
(AThere is no disposition...by means of the Federal bludgeon to force an individual State into an
unwilling submission to arbitration enforcement. That statute cannot have that effect.@); see also
id. at 28 (Rose Statement that the federal law would inspire states to adopt their own arbitration
41

were efforts afoot through the ABA to promote a Uniform Arbitration Act for the states that
would deal with arbitrations in state court.178 There is, however, language in Cohen=s brief,
which was incorporated in the record of the Joint Hearings, that supports the commerce and
admiralty powers as alternative (but not exclusive) bases of Congress power. Entitled ALegal
Justification,@ the section begins by explaining that Congress= power to enact the FAA arises
from the constitutional power Congress has to establish and control inferior courts.179 Cohen then

laws) (A[T]he enactment of this law, extending its effect all over the United States, will have an
effect upon the cause of that much-desired thing-uniform legislation...I have no doubt all of the
States would pattern after it.@).
177

See House Report, supra note 66, at 1 (AWhether or an agreement for arbitration shall
be enforced or not is a question of procedure@); see also supra note 57, Congressman Graham=s
statement on the floor of the House that the FAA Adoes not involve any new principle of law
except to provide a simple method...in order to give enforcement...It creates no new legislation,
grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an agreement...@,; see also supra note 79 at 154,
article by the Committee on Commerce Trade and Commercial Law of the ABA, upon passage of
the FAA, explaining the Act it had been involved in drafting: AThe statute establishes a procedure
in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional
provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts.@
178

In the 1920's , the A.B.A was working on drafts of both a federal arbitration act and a
Uniform State Arbitration Act, both patterned on the New York Act. See MacNeil, supra note 17,
at 41-56. See 1923 Hearings, supra note 39, at 2, where Charles Bernheimer refers to an ABA
report on the parallel tracks of federal and state legislation (>the adoption of .. the Federal statute
and the uniform State statute will put the United States in the forefront in this procedural
reform.@).
179

Cohen made clear that because of this power, the commerce and admiralty powers are
not needed by Congress to enact the statute. Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 37.
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its validity
upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty powers of
Congress. This is not the fact.
The statute...establishes a procedure in the Federal courts for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon the constitutional
provision by which congress is authorized to establish and control
inferior Federal courts. Id.
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made three additional Alegal justification@ points: (1) the statute would not infringe in any way
upon the substantive rights of each State,180 (2) a statute which declares arbitration agreements
valid is nonetheless not a substantive law,181 and (3) arbitration agreements have always been
valid, but courts simply refused to specifically enforce them, although a damages remedy was
available for breach.182
Having provided the legal justification for the FAA, Cohen, in the last four paragraphs of
this section, raised the issue of the commerce and admiralty powers. Although recognizing the
possibility that Congress had the power to make arbitration agreements connected with interstate
commerce or admiralty transactions enforceable by the state courts,183 Cohen concluded that even
if Congress did not have this power, it would not matter for the purposes of the FAA.184 AThe
primary purpose of the statute is to make enforceable in the federal courts such agreements for
arbitration, and for this purpose Congress rests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction
and duties of the Federal courts.@185
Cohen, knowing the FAA was modeled after the New York arbitration statute, and aware
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Id. AA Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration agreements does
relate solely to procedure of the Federal courts. It is no infringement upon the right of each State
to decide for itself what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws.@ Id.
181

Id. at 38.
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Id.
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Id.

184

Id.

185

Id.
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of the challenges to the New York statute on state and federal constitutional grounds,186 no doubt
wanted the FAA to be able to withstand any constitutional challenge. As any well-trained
lawyer, he proposed a fall-back position -- the commerce clause -- and pointed out that the power
of the commerce clause is broad, even broad enough to cause arbitration clauses to be recognized
in state courts. As Professor MacNeil suggested, this appears to be Alawyerly caution@,187 because
Cohen had stated and continued to state clearly and repeatedly that the statute did not apply to the
states and was merely a procedural statute to be applied in federal court.188 Cohen=s suggestion
that the commerce clause was broad enough to give Congress power to apply the FAA to the
states does not establish that this was Congress= intent. Rather, the available evidence points to
the conclusion that Congress never considered applying the FAA to the states, but simply
intended this procedural statute to enable arbitration agreements to be enforced in federal
courts.189
The inadequacy of Chief Justice Burger=s attempt to justify the application of the FAA to
the states in Southland by reference to legislative history has been thoroughly documented
186

See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.

187

MacNeil, supra note17 at 114, n. 61.

188

See supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text. See also e.g. Joint Hearings, supra
note 16 at 37 (where Cohen testified that Congress= power to make arbitration agreements
enforceable Arests solely upon its power to prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal
courts.@)
189

The House Report, supra note 66, states, for example, AWhether an agreement for
arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question of procedure to be determined by law court in
which the proceeding if brought, and not one of substantive law...Before such contracts could be
enforced in the Federal Courts, therefore, this law is essential. The bill declares that such
agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the courts of the United States.@ Emphasis
added.
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elsewhere, in Ian Macneil=s comprehensive book, American Arbitration Law: Reformation,
Nationalization, Internationalization,190 in Justice O=Connor=s impassioned dissent in
Southland,191 in the amicus brief of twenty attorney generals who tried to persuade the Court to
overrule Southland in a later case,192 and in many fine scholarly articles.193 Southland has been
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See supra note 17.

191

465 U.S. at 25 (AOne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA=s.
That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural
statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal
power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.@). Id. (O=Connor, dissenting).
192

Brief Amici Curiae of the State Attorneys General in Allied Bruce Terminix v.
Dobson, 1993 U.S. Briefs 1001 (1994).
193

See e.g. Carrington and Hagen, supra note 2 at 381 (referring to Southland=s Abogus
legislative history@); Schwartz, supra, note 68 (finding that Southland and its progeny are Athe
result of bad statutory interpretation and even worse federalism@); cf. Christopher Drahozal -- In
Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78
Notre Dame L. Rev. 101 (2002) (arguing that despite weaknesses in the legislative history
arguments made in Southland, Athere are >strong indications= that the drafters of the FAA intended
it to apply in state court.@) Professor Drahozal=s arguments are carefully constructed, thoughtful
and scholarly, but he may continue to swim upstream on this point without much scholarly
company. Although he makes interesting points, one of the main arguments he puts forth, and
cites repeatedly, is, in my view, unwarranted. He construes and relies heavily for support of his
position on one sentence in Cohen=s brief, AThe primary purpose of the statute is to make
enforcible in the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration,...@Joint Hearing, supra note 16 at
38. According to Professor Drahozal, this sentence implies that a secondary purpose is to make
arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts. See Drahozal, supra, at 105, 133, 134, 150,
156, 163-64, 169. I submit that the only way this argument can even plausibly be made, is if one
reads only the last four paragraphs in the section of Cohen=s brief entitled Legal Justification and
ignores the rest of the legislative history. At no point in the legislative history does anyone testify
or write that the FAA should apply in state courts, and there are many specific statements that it
does not. The drafters did have secondary purposes for the FAA, however, and these are clearly
expressed. They are to reduce technicality and formality to a minimum (Joint Hearings, supra
note16 at 35), to simplify the process and provide speedy justice (Id. at 27), to reduce the
congestion of court calendars, and to reduce legal costs (Id. at 34). In my view, there is no
difference in Cohen=s statement that the primary purpose of the statute is to enforce arbitration
agreements and Bernheimer=s statement that AThe fundamental conception underlying the law is
to make arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable and enforceable.@(1923 Hearings, supra note 39
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strongly criticized as wrongly decided and as an example of very bad federalism.194 To a great
extent, however, the die was cast in Prima Paint. Prima Paint did not, of course, go the full
distance toward misinterpreting the FAA to apply to states. As Justice Black noted in his Prima
Paint dissent,
The Court here does not hold...that the body of federal substantive law created by
federal judges under the Arbitration Act is required to be applied by state courts. A
holding to that effect B which the Court seems to leave up in the air B would flout
the intention of the framers of the Act.195
However, the step in the wrong direction that the Court took in Prima Paint was large
enough to inspire the Moses H. Cone dicta, which led the appellees in Southland to assume that
the FAA applied to states, and to concede this point in their brief.196 There was thus no vigorous
advocacy on this point, and no amici participated.197 From Prima Paint to Moses H. Cone to
Southland, the descent down the slippery slope was steep and quick. The unfortunate result of the
at 2). As for secondary purposes, or other conceptions underlying the law, the drafters made clear
that simplifying procedures to obtain prompt and just resolution of disputes provided a subsidiary
basis for promulgating the legislation. (Joint Hearings, supra note 16 at 27, 34, 35). The House
Report, supra note 66, confirms this understanding: AThe bill declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for
their enforcement. The procedure is very simple, reducing technicality, delay, and expense to a
minimum and... safeguarding the rights of the parties.@
194

See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 37.
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388 U.S. at 424 (dissenting opinion). See also, P. Bator, D. Meltzer, P. Mishkin & D.
Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler=s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 810 (3rd ed. 1988)
(Prima Paint Acarefully avoided any explicit endorsement of the view that the Arbitration Act
embodied substantive policies that were to be applied to all contracts within its scope, whether
sued in state or federal courts.@)
196

See Brief of Appellees in No. 82-500 (filed June 6, 1983) at 25, n. 30; Keating v.
Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203 (1982).
197

See Brief Amici Curiae in Allied Bruce, supra note 192, text following note 3.
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decision in Prima Paint was that later justices in Moses H. Cone and Southland did not observe
the fine line maintained by the Prima Paint court, and stepped right over it into a major
reconstruction of the FAA as a substantive statute that applied in state court and preempted state
law. Once the Court decided to essentially cut itself free from the legislative history, it then
could create an entirely different statute. It was not persuaded to rethink its actions even by
amicus briefs of at least twenty attorneys general in two major cases, Allied Bruce 198 and Circuit
City,199 pointing out the errors of interpretation of the statute, and the resulting intrusion on state
police powers. So despite the fact that, as Justice O’Connor noted, “[o]ne rarely finds a
legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's,” 200 the Court repeatedly disregarded the
legislative history in interpreting the statute.
But the Court also ignored or misused textualism. In its interpretive decisions, it
repeatedly ignored critical textual indications that the statute was not substantive, but procedural.
For example, the FAA is the only federal “substantive” statute in which there is no federal
subject matter jurisdiction. The text of sections 3 and 4 make clear that a party cannot get into

198

See id., at 3 (ASouthland=s extension of the FAA to state courts...is demonstrably
incorrect and is in tension with important principles of judicial restraint and federalism...@)
199

Brief Amici Curiae of the State Attorneys General in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Saint
Clair Adams, 2000 WL 1369472, at 7 (...@an interpretation of the FAA to apply to contracts of
employment will seriously impair the States= ability to enact and enforce laws protective of
employees by preempting a significant body of state law in an area traditionally within the States=
police power.@)
200

Southland, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984) (O’Connor, dissenting). Justice O’Connor went on
to explain that Ahistory establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a
procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts, derived, Congress believed, largely from the
federal power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.” Id.
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federal court under the FAA; there must be another basis of federal jurisdiction.201 The Court
breezed past this problem, ignoring the obvious conclusion that there is no federal subject matter
jurisdiction because Congress in 1925 thought it was enacting a procedural statute. 202
The Court also ignored the textual indications that the statute was meant to apply only in
federal court, as specifically stated in sections 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11. Textualists assert that you
should look to the text of the statute as a whole.203 If the Court had considered the text of the
FAA as a whole, all of the references to the AUnited States district court@ or Athe United States
courts@ should have made clear that the statute was meant to apply in federal court, not state
court. The decision in Southland, according to Justice O=Connor, was Aan exercise in judicial
revisionism@ that was Aunfaithful to congressional intent.@204 This in turn, contributed to a
number of other decisions straying even further from the statute as enacted.
IV. The Supreme Court==s New Architecture for the FAA
Once the Court essentially severed the FAA from its historical context by declaring it to
be a substantive statute applicable in both state and federal court, it rarely looked back at the
201

Section 3 provides in pertinent part, AIf any suit...be brought in any of the courts of the
United States...the court in which such suit is pending...[if satisfied that the suit is referrable to
arbitration] shall..stay the trial of the action.@ Section 4 provides in pertinent part, AA party
aggrieved by the alleged failure...of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration
may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have
jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising
out of the controversy between the parties, for an order [compelling arbitration].@
202

See Allied Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 291 (Thomas, dissenting) (A[T]he reason that
'2 does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction is that it was enacted as a purely procedural
provision.@)
203
204

See Eskridge, supra note 143 at 42.
465 U.S. at 36 (O=Connor, dissenting).
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legislative history. Moreover, the justices not only ignored the historic context, but also ignored
or recast earlier precedent that was consistent with the intent of the enacting Congress.205 Instead,
the Court relied on its own recently created precedent to entirely rewrite the statute and create an
edifice of its own design.206
A. Pre-emption of State Law
A major change in the architecture of the statute, and the most immediate impact of
Southland=s holding, was the pre-emption of state arbitration law by the FAA.207 The various
Court decisions pre-empting state law on a broad basis caused a seismic shift from the FAA as a
simple procedural statute for enforcing arbitration agreements in federal court to a major
intrusion upon the police powers of the states.208 Initially, there was a question of how broadly
the Court would apply such a doctrine. At first, it took a reasonably constrained view. In Volt
Information Sciences v. Stanford,209 the Court did not find that the FAA pre-empted a California
procedural statute, even though that meant that the arbitration proceeding would be stayed
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See infra notes 229-33, 290-92 and accompanying text.

206

Justice Stevens noted in Circuit City that the Court itself had Aendorsed a policy that
strongly favors arbitration,@ then relied upon the strength of that policy preference to decide
cases, so that Athe Court is standing on its own shoulders when it points to those cases as the
basis for its...construction...@532 U.S. at 132.
207

In Southland, the Court held that the FAA pre-empted a provision of the California
Franchise Investment Law required franchise disputes to be resolved in a judicial proceeding.
208

See Brief Amici Curiae of the Attorneys General in Allied Bruce, supra note 192, at 6
(The control of state court dockets, including the right to a civil jury trial in the state courts...is a
matter solely of state law and state concern.@)
209

489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989).
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pending litigation.210 The Court acknowledged in Volt that A[t]he FAA contains no express preemptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration.@211 The Court=s reference to congressional intent is an understatement. Not only was
there no congressional intent Ato occupy the entire field of arbitration,@ but the statute=s
legislative history negated any intent at all to pre-empt state law. That history made clear that the
statute was never intended to pre-empt state arbitration law, because it was a procedural statute212
intended to apply only in federal court.213
Nonetheless, the Court in Volt, assuming pre-emption was proper, based on Southland,
stated that the question was whether applying California law to stay arbitration Awould
undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.@214 It found in Volt that the state law would not do
so, and was therefore not pre-empted by the FAA.215 This initial reluctance to pre-empt state law
210

Id.
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Id.
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Joint Hearings, supra note 16 at 39-40. At the time, the law of remedies was
considered procedural law, and the widely held view was that arbitral law, which provided a
remedy, was a procedural law. See Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 290
(N.Y., 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (AArbitration is a form of procedure whereby differences may be
settled. It is not a definition of the rights and wrongs out of which differences grow.@)
213

Julius Cohen noted in testimony before the Joint Subcommittee:

Nor can it be said that the Congress of the United States, directing its own
courts..., would infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the States...[T]he
question of enforcement relates to the law of remedies and not to substantive law.
Joint Hearings, supra note16 at 39-40.
214

489 U.S. at 477-78.
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Id.
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was not, however, adhered to in later cases.
Whether or not a federal law pre-empts state law is largely a matter of Congressional
intent.216 One would not expect a broad application of the pre-emption doctrine when a
particular statute, such as the FAA, lacks specific Congressional intent to pre-empt state law.217
Moreover, pre-emption is particularly inappropriate when a core state function is involved.218 A
state=s decisions about its legal processes, and how disputes are legally resolved within its
jurisdiction, are classically a core state function. The Supreme Court has held that A>where... the
field which Congress is said to have pre-empted= includes areas that have >been traditionally
occupied by the States,= congressional intent to supersede state laws must be >clear and
manifest.=@219 The 1925 Congress= intent for the FAA to supersede state laws not only was not
clear and manifest; it was non-existent.
216

See 513 U.S. 265, 283 (O=Connor concurring) (AWe have often said that the preemptive effect of a federal statute is fundamentally a question of congressional intent.@) (citations
omitted).
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In his separate decision in Southland, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Stevens noted:
[W]hile it is an understatement to say the Athe legislative history of
the...Act...reveals little awareness on the part of Congress that state law might be
affected,@ it must surely be true that given the lack of a Aclear mandate from
Congress as to the extent to which state statutes and decisions are to be
superseded, we must be cautious in construing the act lest we excessively
encroach on the powers which Congressional policy, if not the Constitution,
would reserve to the states.@ 465 U.S. 18-19 (citations omitted).
218

English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79. "Where . . . the field which congress
is said to have pre-empted" includes areas that have "been traditionally occupied by the States,"
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be “clear and manifest.'” Jones v. Rath Packing
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Moreover, the Acore principles of federalism@ require that if federal statutes are ambiguous,
they should not be read to displace state law.220 Rather, the Court should be A>absolutely certain=
that Congress intended such displacement before [giving] pre-emptive effect to a federal
statute.@221 Since there was no clear and manifest intent in the FAA, and no absolute certainty
about Congressional intent, one might expect the Court to tread lightly in the area of FAA preemption of state law. Instead, the Court has come down heavily in favor of pre-emption, leaving
little room to the states to regulate in this area.
For example, in Dr.=s Associates v. Casarotto,222 a Montana state law required that a
notice that a contract was subject to arbitration Amust be typed in underlined capital letters on the
first page of the contract or the arbitration clause was not enforceable@ 223 The Montana
legislature had recently changed the law in Montana to make arbitration clauses enforceable, and
the purpose of this notice requirement was to ensure that citizens knew that an arbitration clause
was contained in the contract, because such a clause was no longer revocable at will.224 The
Montana Supreme Court found in Dr.=s Associates that the parties= dispute was not arbitrable
because the required notice was not provided.225 It also reasoned, based on the Supreme Court=s
decision in Volt, that the state statute was not pre-empted by the FAA, because the statute=s
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513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, dissenting).
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Id., citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 510 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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517 U.S. 681 (1996).
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Id. at 683.
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28 Mont. 369, 382 (S.Ct. 1994).
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Id. at 684.
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purpose was to ensure that the agreement to arbitrate was voluntary and knowing; that purpose
did not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA.226
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. In holding that the Montana notice requirement was
pre-empted by the FAA, it gave a very expansive interpretation of section 2 of the FAA. The text
in question provides that written arbitration agreements Ashall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.@227 The Court=s interpretation of this savings clause was that Aany contract@ really means
Aevery contract@ or Acontracts generally,@ rather than, Aany particular contract.@ As a result, in the
Court=s view, the only grounds for revoking an arbitration agreement are grounds that can be
applied to contracts generally, such as fraud or unconscionability.228 Thus, any state statute
which attempts specifically to regulate how arbitration is carried out is likely to be pre-empted by
the FAA.
A more logical reading of the text, which would put arbitration on the same footing as
other contracts, would be that if any particular contract could be voided for a specific ground,
such as not making a provision conspicuous, or violating a consumer protection statute, then an
arbitration agreement should also be revocable on that ground. The Court=s interpretation,
however, that Aany contract@ means Acontracts generally,@ has a particularly intrusive effect on
state law applicable to arbitration agreements. If a state adopts any legislation that treats
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Id. at 685, quoting 886 P.2d at 939.
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9 U.S.C. '2.
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The court cited to precedent in Southland, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1984) and
Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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arbitration separately B if, for example, it tries to regulate possible abuses of arbitration by
legislation focusing specifically on arbitration, as the Montana statute did -- the FAA will preempt that state law. It matters not that the statute reflects a public policy established by the state,
as the Montana Supreme Court found that the notice requirement did.
Although the Court=s decision in Dr.=s Associates was logically consistent with some of its
more recent prior decisions, the interpretation was not warranted by the text and certainly not by
legislative history or by decisions pre-dating Southland. As noted above, the pre-emption
doctrine was announced by the Court beginning with Southland. In Perry v. Thomas,229 a postSouthland case cited as authority in Dr.=s Associates, the Court had difficulty explaining why the
FAA pre-empted state law in that case, because on similar facts in a 1973 case, Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware,230 pre-emption by the FAA was not even considered. In Perry,
the Court held that the FAA pre-empted a California statute which provided that wage claims
must be brought in a judicial forum.231 However, in Ware, decided fourteen years earlier, the
Court had held that the same California statute was not pre-empted by rules of the New York
Stock Exchange, promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.232 In Ware, the
Court briefly mentioned the FAA in a footnote, but never considered whether it might pre-empt
the California statute. In his dissent to Perry, Justice Stevens explained why the FAA was not
held to pre-empt the California statute in Ware in 1973:
229

482 U.S. 483 (1987).
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414 U.S. 117 (1973).

231

Id. at 484.
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Id. at 140.
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Even though the Arbitration Act had been on the books for almost 50 years in
1973, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even considered the possibility
that the Act had pre-empted state-created rights. It is only in the last few years
that the Court has effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope
that Congress certainly did not intend.233
Dr.=s Associates, like Perry, is thus a continuation of the court=s newly created
architecture for the FAA. In finding pre-emption in Dr.=s Associates, the Court stated that one
purpose of the FAA was that arbitration provisions be placed Aupon the same footing as other
contracts.@234 An arbitration agreement, however, is not the exact equivalent of Aevery contract@,
and placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contracts for enforcement
purposes does not warrant artificially forcing them into a box that fits Acontracts generally.@
First, the arbitration agreement is often a provision contained within a contract, so to some extent
it is equivalent to various other clauses of the contract.235 On the other hand, the arbitration
clause is severable from the contract, and can be treated as a separate agreement, as indicated in
Prima Paint, where the Court found that fraud in the inducement of the contract was not the
same as fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause.236 So we are dealing with a concept
that is not quite like the contract of which it is frequently a part, and not quite like any other
clause in a contract, since it is treated as severable from that contract.
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482 U.S. at 493 (Stevens, dissenting).
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517 U.S. at 687, citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974), which
cites H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong. 1st Sess., 1 (1924).
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In Allied Bruce v. Terminix, 513 U.S. 265, 281 for example, Justice Breyer compared
an arbitration clause with other clauses in the contract governing price, service and credit, stating,
AWhat States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms
(price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause.@
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Second, the arbitration clause is different from many other contracts and other contract
clauses, because agreeing to arbitrate means a party has given up a constitutional right to a jury
trial. For this reason, there are times when an arbitration clause should be treated differently from
Acontracts generally,@ in order to ensure a party=s constitutional rights are protected.237 If a state
adopts legislation to make sure that a party is not unknowingly giving up its constitutional rights,
such legislation should be entitled to deference from the Supreme Court as within a state=s ability
to set and enforce public policy. Certainly, a concern expressed by legislators in 1925 was that
any agreement to arbitrate must be voluntary.238
Third, in holding that the FAA pre-empted the Montana law requiring a notice provision of
an arbitration agreement, the Court failed to put the arbitration clause on the same footing as
other contracts. States have frequently required certain types of provisions in contracts to be
conspicuous. For example, an attempt to exclude the implied warranty of merchantability must
be conspicuous.239 If a state law cannot require that a provision containing an arbitration clause
be conspicuous, it means the arbitration clause is not on the same footing as other provisions. In
Prima Paint, the Court stated that Athe purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration
agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.@240 Because an arbitration
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U.C.C. 2-316 (2) (2004) (ATo exclude...the implied warranty of merchantability... the
language must mention merchantability and...must be conspicuous.@)
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388 U.S. 395, 404, n. 12. As one commentator has noted, the FAA should not Aserve
as a special national exemption from state contract law that applies to arbitration agreements but
no other contracts.@ David S. Schwartz, FAA Preemption: Does it Wipe Out State Contract Law?
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provision cannot be made conspicuous, while other contract provisions can be, arbitration
provisions are thus more enforceable than other provisions, and therefore not on the same
footing.241
According to Justice Stevens, the savings clause in section 2242 should permit a state to
declare an arbitration agreement void as a matter of public policy.243 In Southland, he noted that
A[a] contract which is deemed void is surely revocable at law or in equity.@244 If a state has
adopted a regulatory statute that prohibits arbitration in certain circumstances, in Justice Stevens=
view, the savings clause would permit that agreement to be revocable. He and Justice O=Connor
have both noted that Congress can legislate that a particular issue cannot be subject to arbitration,
but the Court has not explained why state legislatures should not be able to do the same.245
According to these two justices, even though the Court has held that the FAA applies to the
states, there is no basis in the savings clause for prohibiting states from regulating what they view
as abuses of arbitration, or from protecting their citizens from potential abuses. Unfortunately, a
majority of justices disagree.
The result of the Court=s decisions in Southland, Perry, Allied Bruce, and Dr=s Associates
10 ABA Dispute Resolution Magazine 23, 24 (Spring 2004).
241

See Margaret L. Moses, Privatized AJustice@, 36 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 535, 540-41 (2005).
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Written arbitration agreements Ashall be valid irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds a exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.@ 9.U.S.C. '2.
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See Southland, 465 U.S. at 19-20 (Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 20.
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See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. at 494 (O=Connor dissenting) citing Justice Stevens in
Southland, 465 U.S. at 21 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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is a massive pre-emption of state contract law. Moreover, lower federal courts have sometimes
gone beyond the Supreme Court=s holding to pre-empt state law.246 In Bradley v. Harris
Research,247 for example, the Ninth Circuit found that the FAA pre-empted a provision in the
California Franchise Relations Act that provided that a franchise agreement could not require
claims to be brought in a venue outside of California. This state law did not single out arbitration,
because it applied to either litigated or arbitrated claims. Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit stated
that A[The California provision] applies only to forum selection clauses and only to franchise
agreements; it therefore does not apply to >any contract.=@248 The court therefore found the
provision pre-empted by the FAA. This result would presumably, however, not affect franchise
agreements with no arbitration clause, since that would mean the parties intended to litigate
disputes. The FAA would be inapplicable in litigation, so it could not pre-empt the same
California law in the litigation context. Thus, California law could override a forum selection
clause outside of California in a situation involving litigation, but not in a situation involving
arbitration. It is difficult to see how this places arbitration contracts on Athe same footing@ as
other contracts.
Bradley indicates how massively state contract law could be overridden in the name of the
246

See e.g. Bradley v. Harris Research 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (FAA pre-empted
state law prohibiting franchise claims to be brought outside of California); KKW Enters, Inc. v.
Gloria Jean=s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (FAA pre-empted
state law prohibiting franchise claims to be brought outside of Rhode Island); OPE Int=l LP v.
Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc. 258 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 2001) (FAA pre-empted state law
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FAA. If the Bradley view were widely adopted, virtually any consumer protection legislation or
anti-discrimination legislation could be pre-empted by the FAA, because it would not apply Ato
any contract.@ Even if other courts do not follow Bradley, however, the Supreme Court=s view
that arbitration agreements cannot be regulated by the states other than by using generally
available contract defenses to revoke such agreements on grounds such as fraud, mistake or
unconscionability, represents a major intrusion into the police powers of the state, and appears
contrary to the Court=s claim of respecting those rights in other contexts.249
B. Arbitrability of Statutory Claims
Another example of the new architecture of the FAA is the Court=s holding in Mitsubishi
Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.250 that the FAA applies not just to contract
issues, but to issues arising out of statutory claims involving U.S. antitrust law.251 This holding
is difficult to support from either the Act=s text or its legislative history. The text of the Act itself,
not surprisingly, reads as though it applies to contract claims, not statutory claims. The pertinent
language of '2 states, A A written provision in ... a contract evidencing a transaction involving
249

In recent times, the Supreme Court has intervened in a number of instances to prevent
the federal government from, in its view, improperly intruding upon state powers. It has, for
example, struck down provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2002)); the Brady Act concerning state cooperation in federal gun
control (Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)); and the Gun Free School Zones Act
(United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)). Cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005)
(holding federal law prohibiting marijuana manufacture and possession did not exceed Congress=
commerce clause power in its pre-emption of California law permitting medical use of
marijuana).
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473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Supreme Court enforced arbitration clause providing for
arbitration in Japan for Puerto Rican car dealership, and required arbitration in Japan of U.S.
antitrust claims raised by car dealership).
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Id. at 637-38.
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commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract...or the
refusal to perform the whole of any part thereof,...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.@ 252 There
is nothing in this language to suggest that it applies to claims which are based on an independent
legal right outside of a contract.
Moreover, the FAA was never described in the legislative history as applying to any
claims other than contract and maritime claims.253 Nor is there evidence that anyone at the time
believed the FAA made statutory claims arbitrable.254 Additionally, until Mitsubishi, every
federal court that considered the question of whether agreements to arbitrate antitrust issues were
enforceable gave a strong and unequivocally negative answer.255 There were significant policy
reasons why the courts believed antitrust claims should not be arbitrated. The most basic was that
antitrust laws are aimed at protecting not only individual parties, but the public at large. An
252
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473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, dissenting) (ANothing in the text of the 1925 Act, nor its
legislative history, suggests that Congress intended to authorize the arbitration of statutory
claims.@)
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See Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A ASecond Look@
at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. L. Rev. 453, 481 (1999) (AIt is by no means
evident...that mandatory law claims necessarily are within the scope of a statutory provision
making irrevocable Aa written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce... The absence of any evidence contemporaneous with the 1925
Federal Arbitration Act regarding the arbitrability of mandatory law claims also would seem to
undermine the Supreme Court=s conclusion, as would the abundant evidence contemporary with
and subsequent to the FAA=s passage of a universal assumption regarding the inarbitrability of
mandatory law claims.@) (citations omitted). See also, supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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473 U.S. at 655-56 (Stevens, dissenting), citing cases from First, Second, Fifth,
Seventh, Eight and Ninth Circuits (citations omitted).
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arbitrator=s role, in contrast, is simply to effectuate the intent of individual parties.256 Unlike a
federal judge, the arbitrator Ahas no institutional obligation to enforce federal legislative
policy.@257 An arbitrator might issue an award that resolved the individual dispute, but was
detrimental to the larger public interest.258 Moreover, the arbitral process itself is less suited to
the resolution of complex antitrust disputes. Frequently, much of the information needed to prove
that a monopolist is monopolizing is under the control of the monopolist. In arbitration,
discovery is limited, making it much less likely that a victim of the monopoly will be able to
establish his case, and protect the rights Congress intended him to have. In addition, an arbitral
decision is virtually unreviewable, because the bases for vacating an award are limited to narrow
statutory grounds essentially permitting review only for procedural issues or arbitrator
misconduct, but not for an error of fact or law.259 Even if a court were to review the arbitral
proceedings, the record of the proceedings would most likely be inadequate for such review. It is
also worth noting that Congress provided that antitrust cases can only be brought in Federal
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See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
473 U.S. at 614 (Stevens, dissenting).
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Barrentine, 450 US at 744. (ABecause the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent
of the parties, rather than to enforce the statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public
policies underlying the [statute], thus depriving [a party] of protected statutory rights.@) As Dean
Philip J. McConnaughay has observed, supra, note 254, at 495,A[T]he very purpose of most
mandatory economic regulatory legislation is to constrain private commercial activity in ways
believed essential to the greater public good. Thus a legally incorrect arbitral resolution of a
mandatory law claim is significantly more likely to affect interests beyond those of the disputing
parties than is a legally incorrect arbitral resolution of a contractual or other elective law claim.@
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Court.260 Therefore, it is not surprising that until Mitsubishi, federal courts were not willing to
permit private arbitrators to assume a jurisdiction that Congress had denied to the courts of the
sovereign states.261
What countervailing reasons and policies did the Court assert in Mitsubishi for applying
the FAA to statutory claims, in the absence of support in the text of the FAA, the legislative
history, and every pertinent lower court ruling? The Court essentially gave two reasons, each
with a twist. First, it relied heavily on the assertion of a Aliberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements,@262 asserting that the Court had no reason to depart from these policy Aguidelines@
when the claims were based on statutory rights rather than contract rights.263 The Apolicy@ of
course, is a judicially-created policy, pulled from the labor law field, and not based on any
preference expressed by Congress for arbitration over litigation.264 Moreover, as noted above,
Congress never expressed any intent for the FAA to enforce agreements to arbitrate statutory
rights.265 The Atwist@ added by the Court, was to assert that there was nothing in the FAA which
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See 473 U.S. at 654 (Stevens, dissenting) citing Judge Posner=s comment in
University Life Insurance Co. v. Unimark Ltd 699 F.2d 846, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1983), that federal
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supported a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.266 Lack of evidence of an intent
not to arbitrate statutory claims, thus became for the Court a reason for the FAA to apply to
statutory claims. This Atwist@ continued as the Court made a similar claim with respect to
statutes, such as the antitrust statutes, where there is no evidence that Congress intended for the
statutory rights to be arbitrated. The Court concluded from this lack of stated intent that Congress
must have intended the opposite - that is, by not saying anything to the contrary, Congress must
have intended for the rights conveyed by those statutes to be arbitrated.
AWe must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute
to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be
deducible from the text or legislative history.@267 In other words, the court takes the lack of any
evidence in the text or legislative history that the statutory rights are arbitrable, and turns this
absence of evidence into a presumption that such rights should be arbitrated because nothing says
they cannot be arbitrated.
The second reason the Court gave for finding the antitrust claims arbitrable was that this
was an international dispute.268 In 1974, in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,269 the Court had found
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473 U.S. at 625 (A[W]e find no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in every
contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims.@
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473 U.S. at 628.
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473 U.S. at 629 (...@[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of
foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial
system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties=
agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.@)
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417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable,270 despite its decision
twenty years earlier in Wilko v. Swann271 that such claims were not arbitrable under the
Securities Act of 1933.272 The Court in Scherk had distinguished Wilko primarily on the grounds
that Wilko involved a domestic situation, whereas the transaction at issue in Scherk was
international.273 The Mitsubishi Court observed that
[a]s in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., we conclude that concerns of international
comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement, even
assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.274
To buttress its position, the Court pointed to another earlier case, The Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co.,275 where it had enforced a forum selection clause requiring London to be the forum
for any litigation between an American company and a German company, on the grounds that if
Americans wanted to do international business, they must abide by clauses they had agreed to in
international contracts.276 The decisions in both Bremen and Scherk, according to the Court,
supported a presumption of enforcement that was Areinforced by the emphatic federal policy in
270
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273

417 U.S. at 515-516.
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Id., at 9. The dissent pointed out that enforcement of the forum-selection clause
would circumvent U.S. public policy, because certain exculpatory clauses in the contract would
be valid in England, but against public policy in the U.S. Id. at 24.
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favor of arbitral dispute resolution.@277 The policy has become even stronger, the Court declared without citing to any text or legislative history -- because the U.S. accession to the New York
Convention meant Athat the federal policy applies with special force in the field of international
commerce.@278
In another twist, the Court found The Bremen highly relevant, because, as it had noted in
Scherk, an arbitration agreement is in essence Aa specialized kind of forum selection clause.@279
To make clear what it meant, the Court spelled out that
[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive
rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral,
rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review
of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.280
By this twist, the Court proclaimed that arbitration was not outcome determinative after all,
contrary to its earlier decision in Bernhardt. Substantive rights, according to the Court, are just
as well protected in arbitration as in litigation. In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored
earlier views it had taken to the contrary, as well as reality. Arbitration does not provide the same
ability to protect substantive rights, and to the extent a party cannot protect those rights, he
forgoes them. And while parties of equal bargaining power who choose to arbitrate their contract
disputes may properly understand and accept the trade-offs between arbitration and litigation,
permitting parties to waive full statutory protection provided by Congress may impinge upon
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third party rights, or the rights of the public at large designed to be protected by regulatory
statutes. Furthermore, in international cases, only a minority of nations permit the arbitration of
mandatory law, so the Court=s move in this direction creates uncertainties not only about whether
arbitrators will properly resolve the claims, but also whether other nations will enforce arbitral
awards based on claims arising under U.S. regulatory statutes, such as its antitrust laws and
securities laws.281
Contrary views expressed by the Court in earlier times show a strong concern about the
lack of protection of rights in an arbitration proceeding. In Wilko v. Swan,282 for example, the
Court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement as to claims brought under the1933 Securities
Act, because protection of the buyer=s rights would be Alessened in arbitration as compared to
judicial proceedings.@283 In Bernhardt, the Court had found that A[t]he nature of the tribunal
where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action@284 such
that A[t]he change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in
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ultimate result.@285 The Court further noted that the elements likely to make a substantial
difference were the lack of a jury trial right, the lack of a requirement for arbitrators to give
reasons for their decision, incomplete records of the proceedings, and very limited opportunity
for judicial review of the award.286 In Alexander v. Gardner Denver Co.,287 the Court noted that
arbitral procedures, while Awell suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII,@288 in
part because A...resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of
courts. @289
These concerns never surfaced again after Mitsubishi, as the Court continued to erect a
larger, more expansive statutory edifice for the FAA=s coverage. The Court fairly quickly
dispensed with an international requirement for finding a statute arbitrable, claiming that Wilko
and Scherk had turned not on the international context at all, but rather on the Court=s judgment
that arbitration in the circumstances of those cases was not an adequate substitute for judicial
resolution.290 Having recast the issue as one of arbitral adequacy, the Court in
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon found that such concerns about adequacy Ano
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longer hold true for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC=s oversight authority.@291 Two years
later, the Court officially overruled Wilko, concluding that Aresort to the arbitration process does
not inherently undermine any of the substantive rights afforded to petitioners under the Securities
Act.@292
There are many good reasons why arbitration of statutory rights is simply wrong. Congress
passed laws such as the antitrust laws, the securities laws and the discrimination laws to protect
parties it thought needed protection, and to benefit the economy and the public at large.
Arbitration does not provide the same level of protection as the courts, because, inter alia, there
is less discovery, an inadequate record of the proceedings, and the awards are unreviewable on
the merits. Moreover, because an arbitration award is confidential, it does not develop the law or
serve as a deterrent to other potential violators. What seems most skewed, however, is that by
giving arbitrators jurisdiction to decide claims under regulatory statutes, the Court is no longer
simply approving the private adjudication of individual contractual agreements, but has delegated
to arbitrators what is essentially the judicial power of the State. Such a delegation, if made at all,
should be made by Congress, after debate and discussion, not by the courts.
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68

After Mitsubishi, however, the Court continued to add more new rooms to its FAA
structure, holding other kinds of statutory rights to be arbitrable, including those under RICO,293
the ADEA,294 and COGSA.295 It is unlikely that many statutes remain today that the Court would
not find arbitrable.296 Moreover, according to the Court, the FAA puts the burden on the party
opposing arbitration to show that Congress intended the statute not to be arbitrable, or that a
party=s waiver of access to the court Ainherently conflicts with the underlying purpose of the
statute.@297 This burden is rarely met. The Court=s interpretation of the FAA as imposing this
burden is based, as you might expect, not on text, and not on legislative history, but on the
Afederal policy favoring arbitration,@298 which in the Court=s view, requires it to Arigorously
enforce agreements to arbitrate.@299 What we have seen is that at significant points in the Court=s
development of the new structure of the FAA, it has repeatedly used its own judicially-created
policy as a major justification for the enormous expansion of the original statute enacted by
Congress in 1925. Because it could not point either to text, legislative history, or precedent in
deciding, for example, that statutory claims were arbitrable, the Court relied heavily on its own
judicially created policy that there was Aa liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,@ and that
293

McMahon, 482 U.S. at 241-242.
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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
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Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
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See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (AIt is by now clear that statutory claims may be the
subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.@)
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490 U.S. at 483, citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
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McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226.
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Adoubts...should be resolved in favor of arbitration.@300
Lower courts as well relied on that policy, and the Supreme Court then pointed to those
lower court decisions as a basis for its own decisions.301 By supporting its decisions with a policy
of its own making, the Court was Astanding on its own shoulders.@302 It then used that policy to
shift the burden to parties opposing arbitration of statutory claims to demonstrate that such
claims were not arbitrable. It thus made the assumption, without any justification in legislative
history or in the text, that unless proven otherwise by statutory history or purpose, Congress
intended all statutory claims to be arbitrable.303 The Court thus used its own policy Afavoring
arbitration@ to bootstrap an alleged intent by Congress for statutory claims to be arbitrable,
without any demonstrable evidence that this in fact was Congress= intent. After Moses H. Cone,
Southland and Mitsubishi, the FAA was no longer recognizable as the statute enacted by the
1925 Congress.
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Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 24.
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Justice Stevens characterized the attitude of the 1925 Congress toward arbitration as
Aneutral@, but noted that Aa number of this court=s cases decided in the last several decades have
pushed the pendulum far beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy that strongly favors
private arbitration. The strength of that policy preference has been echoed in the recent Court of
Appeals opinion on which the Court relies.@ Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 131-132 (Stevens
dissenting).
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Id. at 132 (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
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See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (“The burden is on the
party opposing arbitration...to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. If Congress did intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a
judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent ‘will be deducible from [the statute's] text or
legislative history,’ or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes.”) (citations omitted).
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C. Arbitrability of Employment Agreements
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,304 the Supreme Court reached a high water mark of
statutory misinterpretation. Despite clear indications in the legislative history that the FAA would
not cover workers, the Court gave a cramped interpretation of exclusionary language contained in
the Act, to find that the FAA applied to most employment agreements. The exclusion, found in
section 1 of the Act, states that the Act shall not apply Ato contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.@305
Rather than finding a broad exclusion of employment agreements, the Court held that this
language excluded from coverage only seamen, railroad employees, and other workers in the
transportation industry. A look at how the Court reached this conclusion raises concerns about
whether the textual approach used in Circuit City amounts to a misuse of the Court=s authority.306
The historical context of the Act=s passage is important to a proper understanding of the
exclusionary clause. The only opposition to the Act had come from organized labor, which was
concerned that if the FAA applied to workers, the disparity in bargaining power would permit
employers to coerce potential employees to enter unfair employment agreements, which would
then be enforced by the courts under the FAA.307 The drafters, whose focus was on enforcement
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532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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306

Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, A[W]hen [the Court=s] refusal to look beyond the
raw statutory text enables it to disregard countervailing considerations that were expressed by
Members of the enacting Congress and that remain valid today, the Court misuses its
authority.@Id. at 132.
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532 U.S. at 133 (Justice Stevens, dissenting). Justice Stevens quoted the President of
the International Seamen=s Union of America, who stated:
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of arbitration agreements between merchants,308 assured organized labor and Congress that A[i]t
is not intended that this shall be an act referring to labor disputes, at all.@309 Herbert Hoover, then
Secretary of Commerce, supported the amendment to exclude workers.310 This amendment,
which specifically excluded seamen, railroad workers, and other workers in interstate or foreign
commerce, appeased organized labor. After the Act=s passage in 1925, the American Federation
of Labor explained to its members that it had withdrawn its opposition because the amendment
excluded workers:
Protests from the American Federation of Labor and the International Seamen=s
Union brought an amendment which provides that Anothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.@ This exempted labor
from the provisions of the law, although its sponsors denied there was any
intention to include labor disputes.311
Thus, no one in 1925 B the drafters, the Secretary of Commerce, organized labor, or members of
AThis bill provided for reintroduction of forced or involuntary labor, if the
freemen through his necessities shall be induced to sign. Will such contracts be
signed? Esau agreed because he was hungry. It was the desire to live that caused
slavery to begin and continue. With the growing hunger in modern society, there
will be but few that will be able to resist. The personal hunger of the seaman, and
the hunger of the wife and children of the railroad man will surely tempt them to
sign, and so with sundry other workers in Interstate and Foreign Commerce.@
Proceedings of the 26th Annual Convention of the International Seamen=s Union
of America 203 -204 (1923). Id. at 127.
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1923 Hearings, supra note 39, testimony of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the Committee
of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the American Bar Association, which was the
committee responsible for drafting the FAA.
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Proceedings of the 45th Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor 52
(1925) cited in 532 U.S. at 127 (Justice Stevens, dissenting). Emphasis added.
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Congress B believed that the FAA applied to employment contracts. Regular workers were
understood to be excluded from coverage because the Act only applied to contracts in interstate
commerce, and regular workers were not considered to be engaged in interstate commerce in
1925, unless they actually worked in industries such as shipping or railroads.312 Any workers,
such as seamen and railroad employees, as well as any other workers whose employment might
conceivably be considered to be in interstate commerce, were specifically excluded by the
amendment. Therefore, no workers were covered by the FAA.
So how did the Supreme Court conclude that the amendment only excluded seamen,
railroad employees and other workers in the transportation industry? First, the Court stated that it
had no need Ato assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision@, because the Court
A[does] not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.@313 Rather, it used a
Atextual@ analysis, applying the maxim ejusdem generis, a canon of construction.
Ironically, the Court has repeatedly asserted that canons of construction are to be used when a
statute is not clear,314 and that legislative history can overcome the use of canons of
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Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (Souter, dissenting) ( AWhen
the Act was passed (and the commerce power was closely confined) our case law indicated that
the only employment relationships subject to the commerce power were those in which workers
were actually engaged in interstate commerce.@) (citations omitted).
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532 U.S. at 119, citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994). After
claiming no need to Aassess@ the legislative history, the Court proceeded to debunk it as Aquite
sparse,@ as Aproblematic,@ and as representing the motives of a particular group that lobbied for or
against a certain proposal, whose motives should not be attributed to Congress. 532 U.S. at 11920.
314

Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1984); (“...[T]he rule of ejusdem generis
... is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is
uncertainty”) quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975), in turn quoting Gooch v.
United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936).
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construction.315 Here, the Court turned the methodology upside down, saying that ejusdem
generis made the statute so clear that legislative history did not need to be assessed.316
Ejusdem generis requires that where there are specific terms followed by a general term,
the general term is construed to include only objects similar to the specific terms. For example, if
a bill of a sale for a farm included cows, sheep and other animals, Aother animals@ would
probably be construed to mean other farm animals, but not the pet puppy of the farmer=s child.317
With respect to the exclusionary language of section 1 of the FAA, the Court thus said the
residual clause (i.e., any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce)
Ashould be controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers which are
recited just before it@ (i.e. seamen and railroad employees).318 Therefore, Aother workers@ meant
Atransportation workers.@319
But the court applied ejusdem generis incorrectly because it refused to consider the
legislative history, and the context it provided for the clause. The common characteristic that the
Aother workers@ in this clause shared with seamen and railroad employees in 1925 was that they
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Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 44, n. 5 (Application of ejusdem generis
to apply to words “coal and other minerals” was inappropriate because “[t]he legal context in
which the SRHA was enacted suggests that Congress specifically listed coal to make clear that
coal was reserved even though existing law treated it differently from other minerals.”)
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See 532 U.S. at 139, n.2 (Souter, dissenting).
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See Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 833, 853-55 (1964).
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Id. at 115.
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were all in interstate commerce, as expressly stated in the text, not that they were specifically
transportation workers. If, in the farm sale, the provision had said Acows, sheep and other farm
animals,@ there would be no need to apply ejusdem generis to figure out that the other animals
meant farm animals and not the family pet. The court=s strained interpretation is like declaring
that ejusdem generis required that in the phrase Acows, sheep and other farm animals,@ Afarm
animals@ meant only animals who could give milk. Nothing in the FAA text suggests that other
workers should be limited to transportation workers, rather than, as the text clearly states, Aany
other class of workers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce.@320 The legislative history that
the Court chose to ignore made it very clear that the intended meaning of the residual clause was
that the other workers were workers who, like seamen and railroad workers, were in interstate
commerce, and therefore were unlike most workers, who were not considered to be in interstate
commerce. Specifically naming seamen and railroad workers was to assuage those groups most
actively opposed to the bill.321 The residual clause was to make sure that any worker who, like
seamen and railroad workers, could be engaged in interstate commerce and therefore covered by
the act, was excluded. The purpose of the amendment was to convince organized labor that all
workers -- those who were in interstate commerce, as well as those who were not -- were
excluded from the reach of the FAA. By refusing to Aassess@ the legislative history allegedly
because the text was so clear, the Court essentially freed itself to follow its own preferences and
319
320

Id.
9 U.S.C. ' 1.
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The Court asserted that if the residual clause were found to apply to all contracts in
interstate commerce, it would make the specific mention of seamen and railroad workers
pointless. 352 U.S. at 114. It is not pointless, however, Ato adopt a clarifying amendment in order
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policies as to the structure and application of the FAA, rather than to interpret the legislation
actually enacted.
In his dissent to Circuit City, Justice Souter focused on the majority=s anomalous
interpretation of the words Aengaged in commerce@ of the residual clause. The majority had stated
that even without applying ejusdem generis, it would not interpret Aengaged in commerce@ to
mean exclusion of all employment contracts, because Aengaged in commerce@ was a narrower
term than Aaffecting commerce@ or Ainvolving commerce.@322 Justice Souter made the point that it
does not make sense to read the coverage language in section 2 (that a written arbitration
agreement will be enforced in a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce) as
expanding with the expanded reach of the commerce clause, while reading the exemption
language of section 1 (excluding workers engaged in interstate commerce) as Apetrified.@ In
1925, contracts evidencing a transaction involving commerce did not include ordinary workers=
contracts of employment.323 To the extent that today the coverage language in section 2 broadly
reaches workers under a twenty-first century concept of the commerce clause, the exemption
language of section 1 should just as broadly exclude them. The increasing number of workers
who fall under the expanded coverage of section 2 should fall out of coverage at the same rate by

to eliminate opposition to a bill.@ 352 U.S. at 128 (Justice Stevens dissenting).
322

Id. at 114-119.
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See supra note 312 and accompanying text. See also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Company, 350 U.S. 198, 200-201 (1956) where Supreme Court determined that the employment
contract at issue was not covered by section 2 of the FAA because an employment contract did
not evidence Aa transaction involving commerce@ within the meaning of section 2.
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means of a similarly expanded exemption in section 1.324 This would be a coherent reading of the
statute that would retain its purpose. Instead, workers now viewed as covered by section 2 get
caught in the Court=s web of statutory misconstruction.
The Court=s view that all workers were intended to be covered by the Act, except railroad
workers, seamen and transportation workers, makes little sense. According to the Court=s
interpretation in Circuit City, Congress excluded from coverage those contracts most clearly
involving commerce, but it included those contracts viewed as having a much more uncertain
connection to commerce. In other words, Congress, having declared that the FAA was only going
to apply to contracts involving interstate commerce, meant to include all workers except those
who were actually involved in interstate commerce. This interpretation is illogical, if not
irrational. The purpose of the exclusion, made clear from the legislative history, is that the FAA
did not apply to any employment contracts.
Justice Scalia has criticized the use of legislative history to interpret a statute on the
grounds that it greatly increases a court=s ability to make a decision Abased on [its]policy
preferences, rather on neutral principles of law.@325 Yet, in Circuit City, the Court=s use of a
textualist approach, while refusing to consider the legislative history of the FAA and the
historical context which made it clear that workers were intended to be excluded from the
statute=s coverage, raises similar questions about whether the Court was making a decision based
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See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section
1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary=s Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J.
Disp. Resol. 259, 263-79.
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Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW, at 26 (1997).
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on neutral principles of law. By disconnecting the text of the statute from the purpose of the
amendment intended to exclude workers, the Court freed itself to make a decision based on its
policy preference rather than ascertaining the meaning Congress intended when it adopted the
language excluding workers. Relying on text to the exclusion of purpose can undermine not only
the particular legislation but also the democratic objective of the Constitution.326 Scholars have
opined that isolating the text from the intent behind the text simply means that the law disappears
and is replaced by an exercise of power.327
The Circuit City decision occurred at what may have been a high point in the use of
textualism by the Court. In the paragraph following the declaration that the Court did not need to
assess legislative history because the text was so clear, it then proceeded to address the legislative
history, setting out essentially a critical viewpoint not only toward the legislative history of the
FAA, but toward legislative history generally. The Court noted that the legislative record on the
section 1 exemption of workers was Aquite sparse.@328 It then asserted that legislative history was
326

See Justice Stephen Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY, INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005) at 98-99 (A[N]ear exclusive reliance upon canons and
other linguistic interpretive aids in close cases can undermine the Constitution=s democratic
objective. Legislation in a delegated democracy is meant to embody the people=s will...[A]n
interpretation of a statute that tends to implement the legislator=s will helps to implement the
public=s will and is therefore consistent with the Constitution=s democratic purpose...[A]n
interpretation that undercuts the statute=s objectives tends to undercut that constitutional
objective.@
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See e.g., Stanley Fish, Intentional Neglect, The New York Times (July 19, 2005). See
also, Fish, There is No Textualist Position, 42 San Diego Law Review 1, 21 (2005) (AA text
means what its author intends. There is no meaning apart from intention. There is no textualist
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532 U.S. at 119.
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problematic when inferences of intent were drawn from committees, but even more so when
reference was made to interests groups, such as the International Seaman=s Union, whose
objections prompted the amendment adding the exemption.329 The Court then stated, Awe ought
not to attribute to Congress an official purpose based on the motives of a particular group that
lobbied for or against a certain proposal, even assuming the precise intent of the group can be
determined, a point doubtful both as a general rule and in the instant case.@330
But the intent that the Court needed to ascertain was Congress= intent, made in response
to the objections of the Seaman=s Union, to help explain why a particular amendment was added
to the bill. Textualists assert that legislative intent is virtually impossible to ascertain because
most members of Congress may not even be aware of a particular issue, much less why it is
resolved a certain way.331 In more recent times, however, there has been somewhat of a
resurgence in the Court=s use of legislative history, and a deepening understanding, supported by
scholars, of how the legislative process can contribute to and be understood as the collective
intent of Congress.332 Justice Stevens has contributed to this understanding, noting that,
Legislators, like other busy people, often depend on the judgment of trusted
colleagues when discharging their official responsibilities. If a statute...has
bipartisan support and has been carefully considered by committees familiar with
the subject matter, Representatives and Senators may appropriately rely on the
views of the committee members in casting their votes. In such circumstances,
since most Members are content to endorse the views of the responsible
329

Id. at 119-120.
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See Scalia, supra note 325 at 32.
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See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 205 (2000).
79

committees, the intent of those involved in the drafting process is properly
regarded as the intent of the entire Congress.333
Moreover, scholars such as Professor Charles Tiefer have provided solid scholarly support from
the fields of analytic philosophy of language and political science for using the history of the
legislative process as a valid and reliable concept of collective intent.334
What the interpretive history of the FAA suggests is that both a close examination of the
text of the statute and the legislative history should be used to give to the statute an application
consistent with the intent of the enacting Congress, which remains faithful to the purpose of the
legislation. And while some dynamic statutory interpretation may be warranted, for example,
because the reach of the commerce clause is now broader than it was at the time of the
enactment, the Court should endeavor to interpret the statute coherently and consistently to
maintain the integrity of the statute=s purpose. It should not, as it did in Circuit City, interpret the
commerce clause broadly in one section for the purpose of including workers, and narrowly in
another section for the purpose of excluding them, so that one purpose of the statute -- excluding
employment agreements from coverage -- is completely rewritten by the Court.
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D. Further Pre-emption of State Contract Law
In the recent Supreme Court decision in Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna,335 the
question was whether an arbitrator or the court should decide a claim that a contract was illegal.
The Florida Supreme Court had held that despite the presence of an arbitration clause in the
contract, the court rather than an arbitrator should resolve the question of whether Buckeye
Check Cashing was charging usurious interest rates in violation of various Florida Laws.336
Based on Florida law, the state court held that an arbitration provision could not be separately
enforced when a claim was pending in a Florida court that the contract itself was illegal and
therefore void ab initio.337
Petitioners argued that Prima Paint controlled the decision in this case.338 Prima Paint had
held that in a claim of fraudulent inducement of the contract, the arbitration agreement was
severable and enforceable because there was no claim that the fraud was directed specifically to
the arbitration agreement.339 Therefore, the arbitrator would decide the claim of fraudulent
inducement. Respondents argued, however, that Prima Paint had been decided as a federal court
case under Section 4 of the FAA, a section which the Courts have never applied to the states.340
Further, section 2, the only section of the FAA that had been applied to the states, required as a
335
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threshold question that the arbitration provision be included within a contract.341 If the contract
was void ab initio, then it simply did not exist. Therefore, the FAA could not apply, because the
arbitration agreement then would not meet the threshold requirement of being contained within a
contract.342 Thus, the question, according to Respondents, was one of contract law, which is a
core state function - one that should not be pre-empted by a federal statute that does not even
define what a contract is.343
The Supreme Court, in a 7-1 decision,344 thought otherwise. Justice Scalia asserted that
Prima Paint did control, relying on Southland and Prima Paint to the effect that the FAA was
substantive federal law, that an arbitration agreement was severable from the rest of the contract,
that the law applied in state as well as federal courts, and that the difference between void and
voidable contracts was Airrelevant.@345 Although avoiding any direct discussion of the preemption of state contract law by the federal statute, the Court provided a different and rather
unusual reading of section 2 of the FAA. In response to the argument that when an agreement is
void ab initio under state law, there is no written provision to which the FAA can apply, Justice
Scalia opined that Acontract@ in section 2 can mean a void contract. According to Justice Scalia,
the meaning of Acontract@ in the final clause, which permits non-enforceability Aupon such
Southland, 465 U.S. 1 at 16, n. 10.
341
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position that the FAA Adoes not apply to proceedings in state courts.@ 546 U.S. at _____.
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grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,@346 Amust include
contracts that later prove to be void.@347 Justice Scalia does not acknowledge the common law
concept that a contract that does not exist because it is void ab initio, cannot be revoked.348 A
contract must first exist legally before revocation can occur. Nonetheless, once Justice Scalia
decided that Acontract@ in the last phrase of section 2 can mean Avoid contract@, he declared that
the other three uses of Acontract@ in section 2 also include the meaning Avoid contract,@ stating
that, Awe will not read the same word earlier in the same sentence to have a more narrow
meaning.@349 As a result, here is one way that Justice Scalia thinks the provision should be
understood:
AA written provision in... a [void] contract...to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such [void] contract...or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a [void] contract...shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any [void] contract.350
Justice Scalia appears to be saying that because the meaning of Acontract@ in section 2
includes the meaning of Avoid contract, @ the federal statute pre-empts any state contract law
which would consider a void contract as having no legal effect. The result in Buckeye is an even
broader pre-emption of state contract law than in Prima Paint and Southland, and moves us yet
345
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further away from the legislation enacted in 1925. Buckeye is another expression of judicial
policy preferences to support businesses that seek to limit consumer access to the courts, and to
restrict the ability of states to regulate contract law within their borders.
Conclusion
In creating a statute that goes far beyond the intended scope of the original statute, the
Court has essentially legislated in favor of its own policy preferences, without the benefit of any
input from Congress.351 What are those preferences? As derived from the impact of the
arbitration law on our legal system, certain conclusions seem obvious. The new FAA has
substantially reduced access to the court system, particularly for consumers, workers and those
with little economic power.352 Any employer, hospital, bank, telecommunications company,
transportation company and scores of other businesses can prevent those with less economic
power from ever having access to court to hold them accountable. This means, of course, no
right to a jury trial, limited discovery, frequently no right to a class action, and, because an
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It could be argued, as Justice Kennedy did in Allied Bruce, that Congress, by not
acting to retract the scope of the FAA, has in essence acquiesced to Southland=s application of the
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arbitration award is not reviewable on the merits, no supervision by our court system.353
Moreover, regulatory statutes, enacted by Congress to protect investors and businesses, and to
protect businesses from monopolists, are being privately resolved without any judicial review on
the merits, and without any ability to know if the public interests are being protected as Congress
intended.354 The Court has thus brought to fruition the fears of earlier justices, prior to the
enactment of the FAA, who did not want to enforce arbitration agreements. As Julius Cohen
informed the Joint Hearings, these justices had fears that Athe stronger would take advantage of
the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them.@355 Justice Story had made this same
point in 1845, that while courts have no wish to discourage arbitrations, and would enforce
awards when lawfully made, they hesitated A to compel a reluctant party to submit [to
arbitration] and to close against him the doors of the common courts of justice provided by the
353
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Government to protect rights and to redress wrongs.@356
Despite concerns expressed by Members of the 1925 Congress that arbitration not be
imposed in a Atake-it-or-leave-it@ context, the Supreme Court since the 1980's has created a
statute which permits businesses to do exactly that. Moreover, in finding that the FAA
extensively pre-empts state law, the Court has substantially intruded on state police powers in
two core areas typically within the province of the states: 1. contract law, including consumer
protection, and 2. the resolution of legal disputes within the state or between its citizens. As a
result, states are not permitted to protect their citizens from perceived abuses arising from a
Atake-it-or-leave-it@ arbitration requirement. Any such legislation which requires, for example,
that notice that a contract contains an arbitration clause be given on the first page of the contract,
is invalid because it is pre-empted by the FAA.357
Other nations have made different choices than our Supreme Court. In the European Union,
for example, most pre-dispute arbitration agreements with consumers are invalid under the E.U.
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.358 European consumers generally do not
engage in arbitration unless an agreement to arbitrate is reached after the dispute has arisen. The
356

Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, at 1321.

357

See e.g., Doctor=s Associates, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).

358

Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 095) 29; see also Christopher R. Drahozal
& Raymond J. Friel, Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States,
28 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 357 (2002) (discussing higher level of protection provided to
consumers in the European Union, where consumers generally do not arbitrate a dispute unless
agreement to do so is reached after the dispute arises); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a
Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to
that of the Rest of the World, 56 U. Miami L. Rev. 831 (2002) (discussing the uniqueness of the
U.S. approach of compelling consumers to arbitrate, and suggesting that compelled arbitration
provides a method for corporations to control public policy).
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Europeans apparently believe that consumers can only fairly weigh the differences between
arbitration and litigation and make an informed choice once a dispute has actually arisen.359
Outside the European Union and the United States, there appear to be no countries in which
companies regularly require their customers to use pre-dispute arbitration agreements to resolve
disputes.360
It is a matter of concern that in the U.S., policy choices concerning the appropriate use of
arbitration have been made judicially, not legislatively. These judicial policy choices appear to
reflect the interest of the courts in reducing the judicial caseload,361 and also appear to reflect a
preference for protecting stronger economic interests at the expense of the individual worker,
consumer, investor, or small business, by providing large corporations with a method of limiting
enforcement of legislation regulating discrimination in the workplace, competition practices,
financial markets, and consumer rights.

359

See Sternlight, supra note 358 at 846, n.99.

360

See id. at 850B851 (stating that the author has not been able to identify any such
companies outside of the EU and the U.S.).
361

In The Hundred Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 Stan. L. Rev.
1255, 1264, 1270 (2005) Marc Galanter suggested that the striking decline in the number of
trials, particularly in the last thirty years, has resulted from a Aturn against the law,@ with recourse
to tort reform and ADR as part of a wider wave of deregulation and privatization. He also
discussed the decline as the Athe result of a conjunction of a restricted supply of judicial
resources@ with courts= increasing efforts to Asupply signals, markers, and sufficient background
threats to induce resolution (or abandonment) of claims.@ See also, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 753 (1981) (Chief Justice Burger, dissenting) (AThis Court ought
not to be oblivious to desperately needed changes to keep the federal courts from being inundated
with disputes of a kind that can be handled more swiftly and more cheaply by other methods.@);
Robert Lawrence, 271 F.2d at 410 (A[A]ny doubts as to the construction of the Act ought to be
resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration...to help ease the current
congestion of court calendars.@).
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The statutory misconstruction of the FAA should make clear that there is no one method
of statutory interpretation which can cabin judicial discretion or prevent judicial legislation.
Over the last twenty-five years, the justices have shown an ability to misuse both legislative
history and textualism to reach their desired result, rather than to interpret the statute that was
enacted. This has been true of justices across the board, not simply those considered Aliberal@ or
those considered Aconservative.@362 All of the justices at various points in time lost sight of the
purpose and scope of the legislation, or deferred to faulty precedent, and created a far different
statute from the one enacted by Congress.363
Although theories of dynamic statutory interpretation favor interpreting statutes to meet the
needs of the current era when a clear change in mores or understanding provide a basis for such
an interpretation,364 there is no change of mores or understanding that supports the extraordinary

362

The Moses Cone decision, in which the Court first announced in dicta that the FAA
governs in both state and federal court, and proclaimed that the FAA requires a Aliberal reading
of arbitration agreements@ and requires Aa healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration,@ was written by Justice Brennan, one of the most liberal justices on the Court at that
time. 460 U.S. at 23-24. Dr.=s Associates v. Casarotto, which pre-empted Montana law requiring
notice of arbitration, was authored by Justice Ginsburg. Two of the staunchest opponents of
Southland=s application of the FAA to the states, other than Justice O=Connor, have been Justices
Scalia and Thomas. See Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 284-85 (Scalia, dissenting); 513 U.S.
at 285B297 (Thomas, dissenting). Yet, when the Court expanded the FAA to cover employment
contracts in Circuit City, over the objections of 21 state Attorneys General that this was an
unlawful encroachment on state police powers (see supra note 199 and accompanying text),
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined with Justices Rehnquist, O=Connor and Kennedy in the
majority opinion.
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Justice O=Connor, for example, who had so passionately opposed Southland and the
Court=s application of the FAA to the states, concurred in the Allied Bruce decision, which
refused to overrule Southland, on stare decisis grounds, noting nonetheless that Southland had
Alaid a faulty foundation@ for subsequent decisions. 513 U.S. at 284.
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William Eskridge describes how the Immigration Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. '1182(a)(4),
which provided that A[a]liens afflicted with pyschopathic personality, epilepsy, or a mental
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rewriting of the FAA by the Supreme Court. Rather, the interpretation of the Court is one which
leads back to the Lochner era, when state protective legislation intended to prevent exploitation
of workers was struck down in the name of Afreedom of contract,@ while federal protective
legislation was found to be beyond the commerce powers of Congress. Today, there is widespread concern that protections of consumers, workers, investors and beneficiaries of statutory
protections have eroded as a result of greatly reduced access to enforcement by the courts.365
The laissez-faire philosophy of the Lochner era, that neither state nor federal
governments could restrict the market through protective legislation, came under attack in the
mid-1930's. Legal realists asserted that the Court was simply making a political choice to favor
employers and corporations over workers and consumers.366 The end of the Lochner era was
signaled by cases such as United States v. Carolene Products Co.,367 which established that
legislation governing commercial transaction should not be found unconstitutional so long as it
rested upon some rational basis.368 In Afamous footnote four,@ however, the Court asserted that

defect@ could be denied entry to the U.S. was, in the 1950's and 1960's, interpreted to require
exclusion of homosexuals. As society=s views of homosexuals changed, however, so did the
interpretation of the statute, so that by the 1980's the INS was no longer applying the provision to
exclude homosexuals. See supra, note 143 at 50-55. The provision was repealed by the
Immigration Act of 1990. Public Law No. 101-649 '601. Id. at 51, n.10.
365

See Sternlight, supra note 352 at 1648-55, for a summary of both critics= and
defenders= views of mandatory arbitration.
366

See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697
(1931). For the role of the legal realists in undercutting the Lochner philosophy, see Howard
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers
Jurisprudence (1993).
367
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304 U.S. 144 (1938).
See id. at 152-53.
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legislation restricting the rights of individuals might need to be subjected to a more exacting
judicial review.369
That concern for individual rights has not been apparent in the Court=s interpretation of
the FAA. In disregard of the concern for individual rights expressed in footnote four of Carolene
Products, the Court has used various statutory interpretation techniques to reduce the protections
legislated in the fields of federal antitrust, securities, and employment law, and has intruded
upon state police powers to prevent states from enforcing legislation designed to protect their
citizens against an unfair or unreasonable imposition of arbitration. FAA interpretation creates a
statutory replication of the restriction of both state and federal protective legislation rejected in
1937.370
The Court=s expansive interpretation of the FAA may appear inconsistent with recent
decisions striking down the Gun Free School Zones Act (the Lopez case)371 and certain
provisions of the Violence Against Women Act (the Morrison case)372 as beyond the scope of
the commerce clause. Unlike the decisions interpreting the FAA, which have intruded on state
police powers, in these decisions, the Court has claimed to be limiting Congress= power to
intrude on state police powers. A closer look, however, suggests similar judicial policy
preferences. In both kinds of cases, the present Court, like the Lochner Court, is limiting or
369

See id. at 152, n.4.

370

The Lochner era is generally considered to have ended in 1937, with the decision in
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (upholding constitutionality of National
Labor Relations Act).
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U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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striking down regulatory statutes which protect individuals, using the Constitution for some, the
FAA for others. Justice Souter commented, for example, in his dissent in Morrison, that the
decision Acan only be seen as a step toward recapturing the prior mistakes [of the Lochner
era.]@373 Similarly, in the FAA cases, the Court has undermined both federal and state regulatory
statutes by requiring parties to arbitrate statutory rights, and by striking down state statutes
intended to protect parties from abuses of arbitration. The Court=s interpretation of the Federal
Arbitration Act has led full circle back to the political choices made in the Lochner era - to
undercut state and federal protective regulations, and to favor employers over employees, and
corporations over consumers.
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529 U.S. at 643.
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